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Introduction
AMERICA HAS A PROUD and long-standing tradition of honoring
the aphorism, "Necessity is the mother of invention." Throughout this
nation's history, its citizens have engineered ingenious solutions for
previously unmet needs by manipulating available resources in crea-
tive new ways. The reaches of this innovative problem-solving spirit
have even extended beyond manufacturing companies and research
institutions, into legislative chambers. In early 2007, lawmakers in
South Carolina introduced Senate Bill 480 ("SB 480"), designed to
increase the volume of donated kidneys in order to meet a grave and
growing need for human organs.1
In the United States, the demand for kidney donations is signifi-
cantly higher than that of other organs such as the liver, pancreas, or
heart.2 As of April 2009, over 79,000 individuals were waiting for a
kidney transplant in the United States,3 but only approximately 10,551
* J.D., Harvard Law School, 2008. The author thanks her advisor, Professor William
J. Stuntz, for invaluable guidance and mentorship; her loving family for faithful support
and encouragement; and Dina Awerbuch, Simon Chang, and Dalene Bramer for their
dedication in preparing this Article for publication. Soli Deo Gloria.
1. S.B. 480, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007). This bill should be read in
conjunction with S.B. 481, a bill introduced on the same day by the same sponsor, Senator
Ralph Anderson, on the same day as SB 480. See S.B. 481, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(S.C. 2007). S.B. 481 provides for creation of an organ and tissue donor program in the
Department of Corrections. Id. Earlier in the month, Senator Anderson introduced S.B.
417, which proposed a sixty-day reduction in the prison sentences of inmates who voluntar-
ily donated bone marrow or blood-forming cells while incarcerated. See S.B. 417, 117th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007).
2. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Organ Procurement and Trans-
plantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
3. Id.
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kidneys were donated by nonliving donors in 2008.4 Because the de-
mand for kidney donations greatly exceeds the supply, the average
waiting time for a kidney is 1,121 days, or slightly over three years.5
Therefore, patients in need of kidney transplants inevitably face an
extended period of urgent anxiety as they wait for the life-saving kid-
neys to become available. Unfortunately, many die waiting-in 2006,
almost four thousand Americans finally succumbed because they
never found an organ match.6
In March 2007, state senators in South Carolina concocted a stat-
utory scheme in response to this great need. Had it passed, SB 480
would have given state prisoners the opportunity to shave 180 days off
of their prison sentences by donating a kidney.7 Democratic Senator
Ralph Anderson, a primary sponsor of the bill, made it clear that the
proposal was designed to address the great shortage of organs availa-
ble for donation.8 "We have a lot of people dying as they wait for or-
gans, so I thought about the prison population," Senator Anderson
announced. "I believe we have to do something to motivate them. If
they get some good time off, if they get out early, that's motivation."9
Although the proposed bill hardly progressed beyond the intro-
duction stage, 10 it nonetheless deserves critical examination because it
represents an unprecedented intersection of two well-established
American legal traditions. In this Article, I characterize both of these
traditions in terms of "markets," since exchanges between parties are
central to each. The first tradition involves the "criminal justice mar-
ket," which has at its core the oft-employed practice of plea bargain-
4. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Organ Procurement and Trans-
plantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp (select "Trans-
plant" in the "Choose Category" drop down menu; select "Kidney" in the "Choose Organ"
drop down menu; once both fields are populated, click on the "Deceased Donor Trans-
plants By State" hyperlink). The number of nonliving kidney donations ranged from 8,124
in 2000 to a high of 10,659 in 2006. Id.
5. Organdonor.gov, The Matching Process Waiting List, http://www.organdonor.
gov/transplantation/matchingprocess.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
6. NAT'L KIDNEY FOUND., 25 FACTS ABOUT ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION
(2009), http://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/fsnew/25factsorgdon&trans.cfm.
7. Gigi Stone, Give a Kidney to Shorten Your Prison Sentence?, ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 9,
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/story?id=2940289&page=l.
8. Id.
9. Jenny Jarvie, Inmates Could Trade an Organ for an Early Out; Critics Say the South
Carolina Proposal Would Cross Ethics Lines, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at A25.
10. S.B. 480, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007).
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ing.11 Because this market is open for trade, criminal defendants can
barter their reputations, rights, and freedoms, in exchange for re-
duced criminal charges or shorter prison sentences. The second tradi-
tion is the "human body market," which encompasses both sales and
rentals of the body. State and federal laws have promulgated a com-
plex patchwork of rules to govern this market; subcategories within
the market are open, closed, or regulated, depending on what part of
the human body is sold or rented, and for what purpose. 12
The design of SB 480 creates a fascinating collision between the
rules that control these two markets, which do not otherwise interact.
The bill proposes a bargaining away of criminal punishment in ex-
change for the contribution of bodily organs to meet the increasing
national need for kidney donations. The long-standing tradition of an
open market in criminal justice suggests that prisoners should be al-
lowed to engage in the type of bargain that SB 480 contemplates. Si-
multaneously, a deep-rooted federal law governing the human body
market staunchly prohibits the exchange of human organs "for valua-
ble consideration" of any kind.'3 The impasse that results from this
intersection of contradictory rules seems resolvable only by allowing
the rules that govern one market to take precedence over those of the
other market. This Article analyzes both markets and their respective
rules, theorizes on the assumptions underlying each, and applies the
rules and assumptions to SB 480 to determine which long-standing
tradition, as a legal matter, should have the right-of-way at this
intersection.
Parts I and II introduce the geography of the legal landscape in
each market. Part I discusses in greater detail the criminal justice mar-
ket, explains the prevalence of plea bargaining, and explores the ex-
tent to which criminal defendants have freedom to use their
constitutional rights as currency for trades in the justice system. In
11. "[O]ver ninety-five percent of criminal cases are resolved with guilty pleas." An-
gelaJ. Davis, Racial Fairness in the CriminalJustice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 202, 205 (2007).
12. See infra Part II (discussing the market for sale of body parts, including current
government regulation).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use
in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce."); see also id.
§ 274e(c)(2) ("The term 'valuable consideration' does not include the reasonable pay-
ments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation,
quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost
wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the
organ.").
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addition, Part I closely studies coercion, the primary boundary that
determines whether certain exchanges are permissible in the criminal
justice market. Part II divides the human body market into several sub-
categories and surveys the wide spectrum of rules governing sales and
rentals of the human body. Part III offers two rationales-public su-
pervision and governmental participation-that help explain the
rules that control the two markets. Part IV evaluates the South Caro-
lina bill proposal by integrating the discussions of Parts I-I1 and by
comparing SB 480 to the practice of chemical castration of sex offend-
ers, the closest contemporary example of the intersection of criminal
justice and human body markets. Part IV then offers an analysis and
conclusion as to why, based purely on the current legal framework,
the rules of the criminal justice market would prevail and earn the
right-of-way over those of the human body market.
I. The Criminal Justice Market
Thanks to political rhetoric, news media influences, and some
help from Hollywood, the word 'justice" often evokes notions of abso-
lute rights and wrongs, exonerations of innocent accused persons,
and guilty convictions inspired by flaming speeches avenging victims'
lives. 14 Those images of justice often presume that when individuals
are found guilty of a crime, their punishments match the crime com-
mitted. A closer look at the criminal justice system in practice reveals,
however, that justice outside of campaign speeches, sensationalized
14. Superman, the classic American superhero, boldly stated, "I'm here to fight for
truth, justice, and the American way." See Eric Lundegaard, Truth, Justice and (Fill in the
Blank), N.Y TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at A23. The rhetoric pervades reality as well. During the
trial of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, prosecutor Larry D. Mackey ended his
closing argument by stating:
When Tim McVeigh blew up that truck bomb and brought down the Murrah
Building, he did more than simply create the emotional wreckage that you exhib-
ited-or that we saw during the course of this trial. He did more than kill inno-
cent men, women, and children. What he did was he created a new grievance. A
new grievance. A grievance against the victims and against the United States of
America. And for myself and each member of this prosecution team, it has been
our pleasure to represent those victims and the United States in settling that
grievance. We have done so in a way that Tim McVeigh would not choose. We
have done so through the due process system; but the process is over now. The
process over. Tim McVeigh has received his due process, and it is now time to
render judgment. And yourjob asjurors, your privilege, your duty, as well as your
job, is to do justice. And on behalf of the United States, I ask that you return a
verdict of guilty as charged against Timothy McVeigh.
Larry Mackey's Closing Argument for the Prosecution in the Timothy McVeigh Trial,
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FTRIALS/mcveigh/mcveighclosing.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2009).
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newsflashes, and the occasional box office blockbuster is not so clear-
cut. Thanks to the open market of criminal justice that permits plea
bargaining, prosecutors do not always charge suspects to the full ex-
tent permitted by the law, and convicted criminals do not always serve
the full sentence terms dictated by the law. 15
In 1984, Congress tried to address the issue of sentencing dispar-
ity by creating the Sentencing Commission, 16 which drafted a set of
guidelines designed to "avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct."17 After a defendant is found guilty of a
crime, the Sentencing Guidelines first match the crime with one of
forty-three "base offense level[s]."18 Then, if there are aggravating
"upward departure" factors, such as threatening to obstruct justice,1 9
committing a hate crime,20 or organizing a criminal activity involving
more than five participants, 21 levels are added to the base offense
level. Correlatively, levels may be subtracted where mitigating "down-
ward departure" factors such as elderly age, infirmity, or extraordinary
physical impairment of the offender apply.2 2 The defendant's crimi-
nal history is also factored in with the final offense level to yield a pre-
assigned range of possible prison sentence lengths. 23 The Sentencing
Commission designed these strictures to promote uniformity in sen-
tencing and to avoid the injustice of disparate treatment.2 4
A. An Introduction to Plea Bargaining
Despite the reforms that the Sentencing Guidelines intended to
effectuate, however, considerable disparities in sentences remain due
15. See infra Part L.A (discussing the costs, benefits, and legitimacy of plea bargaining).
16. Dan Haude, Comment, Ohio's New Sentencing Guidelines: A "Middleground" Approach
to Crack Sentencing, 29 AKRON L. REv. 607, 612 (1996).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b) (1) (B) (2006).
18. Higher levels are assigned to more serious crimes. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1BL.1(b) (2007).
19. See id. § 2J1.2.
20. See id. § 3Al.1.
21. See id. § 3B1.1(b).
22. See id. § 5K2.22(1), (2), (3).
23. See id. § IB.1.
24. PaulJ. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 Am. CmiM. L. REv. 19, 20 (2003) ("The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was intended to eliminate unwarranted sentencing dispar-
ity by establishing a comprehensive and consistent statement of the Federal law of sentenc-
ing, setting forth the purposes to be served.... The United States Sentencing Commission
was created to develop the Guidelines." (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39, 59 (1983) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted))).
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to the impregnable power of plea bargaining. Two common types of
plea bargaining include sentence bargaining and charge bargaining. 25
Sentence bargaining occurs when prosecutors offer to recommend a
shorter prison term at the sentencing hearing, in exchange for the
defendant's guilty plea.26 At the federal level, the Sentencing Guide-
lines restrict the degree to which prosecutors may offer seductively
low prison terms; federal prosecutors may offer a recommendation at
the lower end of the sentencing range in exchange for a plea, but they
may not offer to recommend a sentence length outside the applicable
guideline. 27 In states that have not adopted correlates to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, however, local prosecutors are not so re-
stricted when they engage in sentence bargaining; this creates more
opportunity and risk for disparities as defendants and prosecutors
trade jail time for guilty pleas.
The other bargaining tactic that prosecutors use is charge bar-
gaining; under this scheme, officials who have probable cause to pros-
ecute on multiple charges offer to dismiss one or more charges in
exchange for a guilty plea.2 8 Such an offer implies a reduction in in-
carceration time, since a defendant who never stands trial for a crime
cannot be convicted or subsequently sentenced for it. Therefore, fed-
eral prosecutors can effectively use charge bargaining to circumvent
the restrictive effects of the Sentencing Guidelines on plea
bargaining.
Plea bargaining was not always a fixture in the American criminal
justice system. It, too, was the result of the inventive American spirit,
and arose over a century ago largely in response to a mounting load of
criminal cases that understaffed prosecutors' offices could not process
through the ordinary course of trials, which were complex and time-
consuming.2 9 It has since remained, firmly grounded in American
court systems, undoubtedly because it ostensibly offers some benefit
to every major party in the criminal justice system.30
25. See Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan's Law, 89 IowA L. REv.
1535, 1560 n.97 (2004).
26. See People v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Mich. 1982).
27. Joy Anne Boyd, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of Justice's Plea Bargain
Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor's Power Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 56
ALA. L. REv. 591, 600 (2004).
28. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARozo L. REv. 2295, 2340
(2006) (discussing costs and benefits of plea bargaining).
29. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (2000).
30. Id. at 987, 1039.
[Vol. 43
In today's clogged court system, judges are more desperate now
than ever to keep their dockets as clear as possible. Because plea bar-
gaining renders a full trial unnecessary, judges can move cases re-
solved by guilty plea through their dockets much more efficiently. In
addition, judges need not fear reversal on appeal for convictions pro-
cured through plea bargaining. 3' Prosecutors likewise benefit because
they can obtain sure convictions without bearing the costs of time and
resources that trials would otherwise demand. They can also protect
their reputations because guilty pleas equal sure convictions; there-
fore, prosecutors can "win" more cases with a zero percent risk of los-
ing. Furthermore, guilty pleas discharge prosecutors from their
burden of proving a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
3 2
Arguably, plea bargaining also benefits society at large because it
promotes the objectives of economically bringing wrongdoers to jus-
tice and keeping the community safe. Moreover, taxpayer-generated
resources are expended much less rapidly as fewer cases go to trial.
33
In addition, plea bargaining may benefit victims, who otherwise might
have to testify and recount potentially horrific memories of their vic-
timization, and publicly confront the defendant in open court.
Finally, plea bargaining theoretically benefits defendants, who
thus forego a grueling trial process, which is often mentally and emo-
tionally taxing. Furthermore, by avoiding trial and pleading guilty, de-
fendants can choose a sure outcome, instead of betting on the whims
of a jury. Decreased exposure to charges filed by the prosecutor or
31. F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Inno-
cent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PuB. L. 189, 227
(2002) ("[Jludges may face more severe injury to reputation than prosecutors in the face
of reversal. Plea bargaining forecloses this possibility because without a trial, a judge can-
not commit a reversible trial error.").
32. Gazal-Ayal, supra note 28, at 2322-23.
33. See David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 864
(2006) ("The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, after considerable prodding, pro-
vided a one-page summary of the administrative costs of a criminal jury trial in U.S. federal
courts for fiscal year 2002. Factoring in the trial judge's salary and benefits, those of the
judge's staff and the courtroom deputy, miscellaneous expenses, space and facilities costs,
and court security, the Administrative Office reaches an hourly cost of $409.76; at an aver-
age of five hours spent per day on trial, it finds a dally trial cost (excluding prosecution,
defense, U.S. marshal, jury, and jury clerk costs) of $2049. Jury costs amount to $1000 per
day except for the first day of trial when costs of prospective jurors must be included.
Accordingly, total administrative trial costs (excluding first-day juror costs) come to $3049
per five-hour day, or $4278 per eight-hour day."). At its greatest extremes, criminal trials
can cost taxpayers millions. Californians paid approximately $9 million for the high-profile
1995 criminal trial of O.J. Simpson. See Laurie Nicole Robinson, Note, Professional Athletes-
Held to a Higher Standard and Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants
and the Need for States to Establish High-Profile Courts, 73 IND. L.J. 1313, 1313 (1998).
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reduced jail time additionally benefit defendants. And, as will be dis-
cussed later in this Article, defendants can sometimes even use their
power to accept plea bargains to protect family members or other per-
sons who otherwise might face criminal liability.34
Lest plea bargaining be viewed as a flawless panacea, however, it
is critical to note that plea bargaining also comes at a significant cost
to the defendant, who waives federal constitutional rights with any
guilty plea. In Boykin v. Alabama3 5 the United States Supreme Court
explicitly identified three federal constitutional rights that anyone
convicted by plea foregoes. "First, is the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable
to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. '36 Whenever a defendant
pleads guilty, he must admit in open court that he committed the
crime charged against him.3 7 In contrast, if the defendant instead
goes to trial, he can remain silent and offer nothing in the way of
evidence, charging the government to bear to its burden to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that he is indeed guilty of the crime
charged. 38
Second, defendants give up their right to a trial by jury.39 The
Sixth Amendment gives every criminal defendant the right to demand
that his guilt be determined by ajury comprised of randomly selected
members from a cross-section of the community. 40 By admitting guilt
by a plea before an open court, a defendant waives that trial right
entirely.
34. See Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1468 (10th Cir. 1995); see also infra Part I.B.2.d
(discussing the voluntariness of a plea bargain when a prosecutor threatens to incarcerate
members of the defendant's family).
35. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
36. Id. at 243.
37. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ("Central to the plea and the
foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission in
open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment.").
38. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1969) ("The requirement of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons.
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance,
both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of
the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that
values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt."); see also FED. R.
CRiM. P. 11 (b) (2).
39. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
40. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292 (1989) ("[Tlhe Sixth Amendment required
that the jury venire be drawn from a fair cross section of the community.").
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Third, the Boykin Court acknowledged that anyone who pleads
guilty relinquishes his right to confront his accusers. 41 In the absence
of a plea, the government must present evidence of the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant has a right to
challenge the prosecution's witnesses through cross-examination. 42
Each of the foregoing rights is considered fundamental to Ameri-
can criminal jurisprudence. The rights are regarded as critical safe-
guards against government oppression, and as hallmarks that
historically revolutionized the American legal system and protected
citizens from tyrannical rule. Despite the great import of these rights,
the modern American judicial system allows prosecutors to make of-
fers that entice defendants to barter away their constitutional rights.
In this open market, prosecutors trade the state's right to impose a
maximum prison sentence or to pursue the full panoply of criminal
charges, and the defendant, in turn, trades a set of constitutional
rights. History has shown that this criminal justice market is widely
active. In 2004, ninety-five percent of all felons in state courts were
convicted by guilty pleas, whereas only two percent were convicted by
juries, and three percent were convicted in a bench trial.43
B. The Law Governing Plea Bargaining
The growing popularity of plea bargaining, viewed by many pros-
ecutors as an efficient tool for case disposal, has been fueled in recent
decades by a stream of legal precedents that endorse its use. Judicially
created standards concerning the voluntariness of a defendant's deci-
sion to plead guilty form boundaries to fence in the wide expanse of
permissible plea bargaining.44 As a general rule, courts have deter-
mined that coerced pleas are not permissible, while all others are
valid. 45 As the Supreme Court clearly declared, "A guilty plea, if in-
duced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a
voluntary act, is void."46
41. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
42. Defendants generally have a right under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine
witnesses who testify against them. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008)
(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).
43. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF
CoNvIcTED FELONS 2004-STATISTIcAL TABLES, at tbl.4.1 (2004), available at http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/scscfO4/tables/scsO4401 tab.htm.
44. See generally Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (finding that the defen-
dant's guilty plea was voluntary even though the plea may have been influenced by a desire
to avoid the death penalty).
45. Id. at 747 n.4.
46. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
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Because courts have had difficulty applying this rule-however
unambiguous in theory-to real cases, the doctrine of voluntariness
has evolved such that courts now rely on a "checklist" of requirements
to determine whether the defendant's plea was voluntary.47 The
"checklist" closely tracks the language of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which governs plea bargains. The most fre-
quently cited Rule 11 requirements are: (a) the judge must personally
address the defendant personally in open court before accepting a
guilty plea; (b) the judge must personally inform the defendant of the
constitutional rights that the defendant waives by pleading guilty; (c)
the judge must "determine that the plea is voluntary and did not re-
sult from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea
agreement)"; and (d) the court must determine a "factual basis" for
the guilty plea.48 In practice, these factors leave little room for defen-
dants to successfully protest the voluntariness of their guilty pleas. The
following study of seminal cases from the past five decades illuminates
the way that judges expanded the realm of prosecutorial discretion
while narrowing available coercion claims to an almost imperceptible
sliver.
1. Coercion Is Functionally Determined by Objective Analysis
In Ford v. United States,49 the Eighth Circuit concluded that a de-
fendant's guilty plea was in fact voluntary after conducting a two-part
47. See Gonzalez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1765, 1768 (2008) ([Under FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11 (b),] the district court is required, as a precondition to acceptance of a guilty plea, to
inform the defendant in person of the specified rights he or she may claim in a full crimi-
nal trial and then verify that the plea is voluntary by addressing the defendant. The re-
quirement is satisfied by a colloquy between judge and defendant, reviewing all of the
rights listed in Rule 11."); see also United States v. Ward, 518 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2008)
(declaring that an adequate record for a reviewing court regarding the constitutionality of
a plea "may consist of a defendant's explicit answers during the plea colloquy to inquiries
concerning the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charges, the consequences
of pleading guilty to the charges, and the rights being waived"); United States v. Sura, 511
F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing how the trial court laid out specific rights that the
defendant would be "giving up" by signing a plea agreement, but also stating that by failing
to mention the waiver of defendant's appellate rights, the court omitted a point specified
in FED. R. CmiM. P. 11(b) (1) (N)); United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2007)
(stating that "[a] district court may not accept a plea of guilty without first personally ad-
dressing the defendant, under oath and in open court, and ascertaining that the plea is
voluntary"); United States v. Benz, 472 F.3d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that a failure
to comply with Rule 11, by not informing the defendant of the mandatory minimum sen-
tence, was reversible error).
48. FED. R. CRUM. P. 11.
49. 418 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1969).
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analysis involving both subjective and objective factors.50 The Eighth
Circuit stated that the subjective analysis should be based on the de-
fendant's understanding of the nature of the plea agreement and its
consequences. 5' Critics of this type of subjective analysis could argue
that the Eighth Circuit's standard was too vague and prone to abuse
by prisoners who might attack their plea-based convictions by feigning
ignorance of the pleading process or its consequences; however, the
Ford Court foreclosed any basis for that concern. It effectively eradi-
cated the subjective analysis that it had just introduced in the same
breath by declaring, "[T] he question of involuntariness raised by peti-
tioner always presents a troublesome issue in that the subjective mind
of the petitioner is in question but resolution of that factual issue most
often must be determined by objective evidence." 52 After that pro-
nouncement, only Rule 11 requirements were left to determine the
factors that should be included in the objective test analysis.
Applying the objective test, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
when an accused is adequately represented by counsel and is made
aware of the consequences of his guilty plea and is in fact guilty of
the crime charged, he is then in the position to make a measured
and deliberate choice of whether to plead guilty or to exercise his
constitutional prerogative of trial. 53
The court also noted, "[u]nder these circumstances a guilty plea
meets constitutional and legal standards and the plea itself is a convic-
tion. '54 To support its conclusion that the first requirement of Rule 11
was met, the Eighth Circuit examined the record and found that the
defendant had on three occasions discussed the terms of the plea
agreement with his attorney, and that the defendant was duly in-
formed of the consequences of his guilty plea.55 In addition, the court
determined that the trial judge complied with the second Rule 11 re-
quirement "by personally addressing the [defendant] and satisfying
himself that the plea was voluntary."56 Specifically, the court found it
significant that the defendant himself asserted that his plea was in-
deed voluntary, that he said no government official had tendered
threats or promises, and that he provided enough facts to form a fac-
tual basis for the plea during his plea allocution. 57
50. Id. at 858.
51. Id. at 859.
52. Id. at 858.
53. Id. at 859.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 857.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 860.
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The United States Supreme Court in Brady v. United States also
evaluated the voluntariness of a plea based on the lower court's com-
pliance with Rule 11 requirements. 58 It found that the defendant's
plea was "intelligently made" because the defendant
was advised by competent counsel, he was made aware of the na-
ture of the charge against him, and there was nothing to indicate
that he was incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental
faculties; once his confederate had pleaded guilty and became
available to testify, he chose to plead guilty, perhaps to ensure that
he would face no more than life imprisonment or a term of
years. 59
The foregoing applications of the objective test reflect the courts'
heavy reliance on trial court judges as major gatekeepers to safeguard
defendants' interests against the great power of the state in the bar-
gaining process. When defendants appeal their plea convictions on
grounds of involuntariness, appellate courts evaluate the colloquy that
the trial judge conducted with the defendant. "The record must re-
flect a genuine attempt by the judge to probe the defendant's mind to
ensure that the plea is voluntary and not made under coercion, that
the defendant understands the rights being waived, and that a factual
basis underlies the guilty plea. '60 Appellate courts also review the re-
cord for evidence that the trial judge asked the defendant a series of
questions designed to ensure that the defendant understood the plea
agreement and its consequences. 61 If the higher courts are satisfied
with the lower court's dialogue with the defendant as demonstrated in
the record, they rule against him and affirm the conviction on
appeal. 62
2. The Meaning of "No Improper Threats"
In addition to objectively assessing the defendant's own under-
standing of the plea agreement and its consequences, courts also con-
sider prosecutorial influences on the voluntariness of a plea. Since the
1960s, the Supreme Court and circuit courts have scrutinized various
tactics employed by prosecutors to pressure defendants into pleading
58. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744 (1970).
59. Id. at 756.
60. John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid Criminal
Juror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRmM. L. REv. 1187, 1224 (2002).
61. See, e.g., Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing the district
court's denial of habeas relief, in part because "Boykin established that the record of a
guilty plea must affirmatively disclose that the defendant made his plea intelligently and
voluntarily," and the Second Circuit "f[ound] no such assurance in [the] record").
62. See United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710 (2d Cir. 1997).
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guilty. A review of the key cases that led to the modern boundary of
permissible prosecutorial threats follows.
a. Machibroda (1962): A "Marginal" Case
In Machibroda v. United States,63 defendant John Machibroda al-
leged that the prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA")
promised him a prison sentence of no more than twenty years in ex-
change for a guilty plea, indicated that the promise of a reduced in-
carceration period was made on the authority of the United States
Attorney, and told Machibroda that the plea bargain was "agreeable to
the District Judge."64 According to Machibroda, the AUSA also
warned him not to tell his attorney about the conversations regarding
the plea, and threatened to compound the defendant's criminal
charges with robbery charges that had not yet been dealt with if he
"insisted in making a scene."65 Machibroda then pled guilty, but peti-
tioned the higher court to vacate the resulting conviction and set
aside the subsequent sentence, based on the foregoing allegations. 66
The appellate court denied Machibroda's request without even grant-
ing him a hearing.67
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's judg-
ment and remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether
Machibroda's allegations were factual.68 The Court stated that the
facts as Machibroda portrayed them presented a "marginal" case, and
that if the allegations were true, the Court would vacate his sentence
because "a guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive
it of the character of a voluntary act, is void."69 Machibroda had made
a number of allegations in his petition, including the prosecutor's
threat to take action on additional robbery charges, a representation
of judicial approval of the plea, and an order not to avail himself of
legal counsel regarding the terms of the plea bargain. 70 The Court did
not indicate which of those factors, if true, would have been sufficient
to "deprive [the plea] of the character of a voluntary act."7' There-
63. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
64. Id. at 489.
65. Id. at 489-90.
66. Id. at 488-90.
67. Id. at 488-89.
68. Id. at 496.
69. Id. at 493.
70. Id. at 490 n.1.
71. Id. at 493.
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fore, the boundary of permissible prosecutorial actions in plea bar-
gaining remained vague and undefined in the early 1960s.
b. Ford (1969) and Brady (1970): A Broadened Scope of
Prosecutorial Power
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, plea bargaining jurisprudence
settled into a position that granted prosecutors wide latitude. As the
language in Ford v. United States72 and Brady v. United States73 illustrates,
prosecutors must reach a high bar before courts entertain the possibil-
ity of calling their actions improper. In Ford v. United States, the Eighth
Circuit stated, "To constitute fear and coercion on a plea, 'Petitioner
must show he was subjected to threats or promises of illegitimate ac-
tion'; and fear of a greater sentence may induce a valid plea of
guilty. '74 The Eighth Circuit thus legitimized prosecutorial threats to
pursue maximum prison sentences or to press every available charge
against a defendant for purposes of procuring guilty pleas, even if the
prosecutors would not have otherwise taken such actions. 75 In doing
so, the court concluded that it would condone prosecutorial action as
long as the prosecutors limited the scope of their threats to actions
within their original scope of power. 76
The Supreme Court echoed similar sentiments in Brady v. United
States, decided a year after Ford.77 In that case, defendant Robert Brady
pled guilty to kidnapping, but later appealed his conviction on
grounds that his plea was involuntary.78 Brady initially pleaded not
guilty, but when prosecutors notified him that his co-defendant pled
guilty and expressed willingness to testify against him, Brady changed
72. 418 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1969).
73. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
74. Ford, 418 F.2d at 858 (citing Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 799 (1st Cir.
1959) (emphasis added)).
75. The Ford court noted in dicta that "[a ] threat to prosecute under state law where
the facts warrant prosecution should not be considered as coercive or intimidating." Id. at
859. Continued the court: "To constitute fear and coercion on a plea 'Petitioner must show
he was subjected to threats or promises of illegitimate action[;]' [ ] and fear of a greater
sentence may induce a valid plea of guilty." Id. (quoting Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d
795, 799 (1st Cir. 1959) (emphasis added). "[T]the State certainly has the right to proceed
with any prosecution that is warranted under the factual situation." Id. at 859.
76. See also Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 n.8 ("In Brady's case there is no claim that the
prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence or that the
trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted after trial in order to
induce him to plead guilty.").
77. Id.
78. See id. at 743-44.
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his mind. 79 Apparently convinced that his co-defendant's testimony
would be sufficient to support a conviction, and motivated in part by
fear that he might receive the death penalty if convicted at trial, Brady
accepted a plea bargain.80 He was then sentenced to fifty years in
prison even though the statute allowed a maximum penalty of life in
prison or capital punishment.8 '
In its evaluation of Brady's claim, the Supreme Court announced:
The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essen-
tially "[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must
stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue im-
proper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecu-
tor's business (e.g. bribes)."8 2
The Court also ruled that public officials "may not produce a plea by
actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing
the will of the defendant," but held that because Brady was not "so
gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope of leniency," he was, in
the Court's estimation, free to exercise independent and rational
judgment in his decision to plead guilty.8 3
The question that Machibroda left unanswered, then, Ford and
Brady addressed. Under the latter judicial formulations, the only im-
propriety in Machibroda lay in the prosecutor's order that restrained
the defendant from discussing the plea bargain conversations with his
own attorney.84 It was entirely permissible, however, for Machibroda's
prosecutor to threaten additional robbery charges in retaliation
against an uncooperative defendant, since the prosecutor already had
probable cause to bring forth those charges.
79. Id. at 743.
80. Id.
81. The statute under which Brady was convicted reads:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who
has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted,
or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of
a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped
person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so
recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death
penalty is not imposed.
Id. at 743 n.I (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000)).
82. Id. at 755 (internal citations omitted).
83. Id. at 750.
84. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1962).
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c. Bordenkircher (1978): Deeper Entrenchment for Broad
Prosecutorial Power
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,85 the Supreme Court solidified the Ford
and Brady precedents, painting broadly the rights of prosecutors to
exert leverage over defendants in plea bargains. The Court decided
there was no improper threat when Paul Hayes' prosecutor told him
that if he did not plead guilty and "save[ ] the court the inconve-
nience and necessity of a trial,"'86 the prosecutor would return to the
grand jury to seek an indictment under the Habitual Criminal Act.87 If
the prosecutor moved forward with the additional indictment, Hayes
would unquestionably be convicted and face life imprisonment be-
cause he had two prior felony convictions. 88 When Hayes insisted on
pleading not guilty, the prosecutor followed through on his threat
and reindicted Hayes under the Habitual Criminal Act.89 A jury con-
viction followed, and Hayes was sentenced to life in prison.90
On appeal, the Court ruled that the prosecutor's actions were not
improper and emphasized the importance of the prosecutor's inten-
tion, which was "clearly expressed at the outset of the plea negotia-
tions."91 It also noted that Hayes was "fully informed of the true terms
of the offer."92 Under the Bordenkircher Court's characterization, the
prosecutor merely "openly presented the defendant with the unpleas-
ant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was
plainly subject to prosecution. '93 A footnote tucked away in
Bordenkircher indicated that the Court might consider a plea involun-
tary where the "prosecutor's offer during plea bargaining [involved]
adverse or lenient treatment for some person other than the ac-
85. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
86. Id. at 359 n.1.
87. In 1975, Kentucky repealed its three-strikes-like statute, the Habitual Criminal Act,
then codified at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.190 (West 1973).
88. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 370.
89. The Court noted:
[I]t is not disputed that the recidivist charge was fully justified by the evidence
that the prosecutor was in possession of this evidence at the time of the original
indictment, and that Hayes' refusal to plead guilty to the original charge was what
led to his indictment under the habitual criminal statute.
Id. at 359.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 360.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 365.
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cused,"9 4 but did not address the question since Paul Hayes did not
allege any such offer.
d. Pollard (1992) and Miles (1995): Plea Whing Cases
What the Bordenkircher Court left open for consideration in foot-
note eight, was addressed by the D.C. Court of Appeals fourteen years
later, when United States v. Pollard95 brought the concept of "plea wir-
ing" to the fore of judicial consideration. 96 Jonathan Pollard was ar-
rested and charged with espionage for delivering national defense
information to the Israeli government.9 7 Upon his arrest, Jonathan
sent a code signal to his wife Anne, who followed pre-set instructions
and "removed a suitcase full of classified U.S. intelligence information
from the Pollards' apartment and contacted Pollard's Israeli handlers
to tell them that Pollard was in trouble... ."98 Although those actions
constituted the entirety of Anne's undeniably minimal role in her hus-
band's treason, the government nonetheless charged her as an acces-
sory.99 Prosecutors then approached Jonathan with a plea deal that
"wired" his plea to Anne's; unless Jonathan agreed to plead guilty and
comply with a number of requirements, the government refused to
enter into plea negotiations with his wife. 100 The terms of the pro-
posed plea agreement included Jonathan's submission to polygraph
tests and assistance to the government as it computed the damages
caused by his espionage. 10 1 In addition, under the terms of the plea
agreement, if Anne failed to fulfill her end of her own plea bargain,
Jonathan's would be voided.1 0 2 Thus, Anne's plea agreement was like-
wise wired to her husband's.
94. Id. at 364. The Court stated:
This case does not involve the constitutional implications of a prosecutor's offer
during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person other than
the accused,. . . which might pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea
by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant must consider.
Id. at 364 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
95. 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
96. Id. at 1021.
97. For about a year and a half, Pollard-a Navy Intelligence Research Specialist-
"removed large amounts of highly classified U.S. intelligence information from his office,
copied it, and delivered it to agents of the Israeli government." Id. at 1015.
98. Id. at 1016.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1011, 1016-19.
101. Id. at 1016.
102. Id. Specifically,
Pollard was bound to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to deliver national
defense information to a foreign government (18 U.S.C. § 794(c)), which carried
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Notably, by the time these plea offers had been made, Anne had
already suffered a serious illness that caused her health to deteriorate
significantly after her arrest and subsequent imprisonment in a D.C.
jail. 103 Despite these circumstances-the wired plea, combined with
the pressure that Anne was in poor and worsening health-the court
determined that Jonathan's plea was not the product of coercion. 10 4
The D.C. Circuit expressed agreement with other circuits that had
consistently decided that plea wiring was not, in itself, unconstitu-
tional as a violation of due process rights or the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 10 5
The Pollard court framed the question as "whether the practice of
plea wiring is so coercive as to risk inducing false guilty pleas." 10 6 Elab-
orating on the operative word coercive, the circuit court opined that,
"to say that a practice is 'coercive' or renders a plea 'involuntary'
means only that it creates improper pressure that would be likely to
overbear the will of some innocent persons and cause them to plead
guilty."'01 7 In the way of examples, the court echoed the Supreme
Court's Brady decision, stating, "physical harm, threats of harassment,
misrepresentation, or 'promises that are by their nature improper as
having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.
bribes)' render a plea legally involuntary."'10 8
a maximum prison term of life, and to cooperate fully with the government's
ongoing investigation. He promised not to disseminate any information concern-
ing his crimes without submitting to pre-clearance by the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence. His agreement further provided that failure by Anne Pollard to adhere to
the terms of her agreement entitled the government to void his agreement, and
her agreement contained a mirror-image provision.
Id.
103. Id.
104. The D.C. Circuit noted that Anne Pollard was so ill that she lost forty pounds
during her three months in jail. The court later ruled, however, that
[t] he appropriate dividing line between acceptable and unconstitutional plea wir-
ing does not depend upon the physical condition or personal circumstances of
the defendant; rather, it depends upon the conduct of the government. Where,
as here, the government had probable cause to arrest and prosecute both defend-
ants in a related crime, and there is no suggestion that the government con-
ducted itself in bad faith in an effort to generate additional leverage over the
defendant, we think a wired plea is constitutional.
Id. at 1021; see also id. at 1016-21.
105. Id. at 1020-21 ("The circuits that have considered the question, however, while
occasionally expressing distaste for the practice, have uniformly agreed that it does not, per
se, offend due process or the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." (internal
citations omitted)).
106. Id. at 1021.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970)).
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Even after recognizing that "a threat of long imprisonment for a
loved one, particularly a spouse, would constitute even greater pres-
sure on a defendant than a direct threat to him," the court did not
consider Jonathan's wired plea unconstitutional or void.109 Further-
more, the circuit court specifically pointed out that Anne's serious
medical issues did not change its assessment ofJonathan's plea as vol-
untary because the borderline of acceptability in plea wiring does not
depend on physical or personal circumstances; instead, the court
stated, "it depends upon the conduct of the government."110 In evalu-
ating that conduct, the circuit court found that "almost anything law-
fully within the power of a prosecutor acting in good faith can be
offered in exchange for a guilty plea." ' 1
Therefore, under the court's view, the prosecutor did not im-
properly threaten the Pollards. After all, Anne Pollard did, in fact,
play an accessory role in her husband's espionage, and the govern-
ment was not required to offer either Anne or Jonathan a plea deal in
any case. So, in threatening to continue pressing full charges against
Anne, prosecutors were merely doing what they had a right to do in
the first place. Consequently, the appellate court was satisfied that no
improper threat had been made.
The Tenth Circuit echoed these sentiments in Miles v. Dorsey,112
another plea wiring case. There, prosecutors offered a plea deal that
promised lenience to Vernard Miles, Jr. and several of his family mem-
bers.113 Specifically, the plea agreement was designed to shield his
parents, his sisters and sister-in-law from imprisonment; and to effec-
tuate his brother's release from prison.114 Miles did plead guilty, and
the appellate court rejected his attack on the subsequent conviction
when he appealed on grounds that his plea was involuntary. 115
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1016-19.
112. 61 F.3d 1459 (10th Cir. 1995).
113. Id.
114. The court noted:
[T]he state proposed a new plea and disposition agreement whereby Petitioner
would plead no contest to one count of murder and two counts of first degree
criminal sexual penetration. In exchange, the state agreed to drop thirty of the
thirty-three felony charges against Petitioner, and ensure that his family would
serve no jail time for their concealment of his offenses. The state agreed to allow
Petitioner's parents to plead no contest and serve probation on a conspiracy
charge filed against them, dismiss criminal charges against his sisters and sister-in-
law, and release his brother James Miles from prison.
Id. at 1464.
115. Id. at 1469.
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The Miles court decided that the defendant's guilty plea was not
involuntary just because the government used its prosecutorial power
against the defendant's family members as a bargaining chip. The
court ruled that "so long as the government has prosecuted or
threatened to prosecute a defendant's relative in good faith, the de-
fendant's plea, entered to obtain leniency for the relative, is not invol-
untary."1 16 The court further stated that the prosecution acts in "good
faith" when it has probable cause to prosecute a third party. 117 There-
fore, since Miles's prosecutors had probable cause to prosecute the
defendant's family members, the state's offer of leniency in exchange
for a guilty plea was a valid and constitutional exercise of power that
did not render the plea involuntary. 118
The foregoing outline of key precedents in the law of plea bar-
gaining demonstrates the courts' consistent willingness to expand the
jurisdiction of prosecutorial power. Courts have refused to determine
that a plea was coerced unless the prosecutor engaged in particularly
reprehensible actions that were blatantly illegal in their own right. As
a result, the courts created incredible latitude for prosecutors in the
plea bargaining process.
II. The Human Body Market
Unlike the relatively open criminal justice market, the human
body market involves a much more regulation. Although SB 480 only
relates to organ donation, it is helpful to put the bill into context by
undertaking a broader analysis of the laws that govern exchanges re-
lating to the body in a variety of subcategories: sales of the entire
body, exchanges involving parts of the body, and rentals of the body.
A. Sales of the Entire Body
Since the abolition of slavery in 1865, the rule governing sales of
humans has been resolute and unyielding: it is illegal to sell people in
the United States. The Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution specifically protects every American citizen from enslave-
116. Id. at 1468.
117. Id.
118. The court found that
[i] n the absence of facts demonstrating that the government prosecuted his fam-
ily without probable cause in an attempt to gain leverage over Petitioner, the fact
that he entered his plea out of a desire to protect his validly indicted family from
further prosecution, does not render an otherwise voluntary plea involuntary.
Id. at 1469.
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ment, 119 a regime in which people are treated as property that can be
bought and sold in a "human market." The national sentiment against
the sale of humans has even inspired some states to fashion laws that
prohibit the offering, payment, or receipt of any "money or other con-
sideration or thing of value, directly or indirectly" in connection with
the adoption of a child.120 Regardless of age (adult or child) and irre-
spective of the underlying purpose-whether nefarious (slavery) or
noble (parenting)-the market involving the sale or purchase of a
human being in America is closed, as any exchanges within that mar-
ket are illegal and consequently void.
B. Exchanges Involving Parts of the Body
The degree of openness in the market of human body parts
seems to vary according to the scarcity and importance of the specific
part at issue. Where the body part being sold is non-vital and clearly
regenerates, the market is wide open. For example, human hair is
widely peddled across the United States. 12 1 The market for human
hair is especially active on the Internet, where bids for seventeen in-
ches of "dead straight hair, never straightened or blow dried," start at
$700.122 Ostensibly because hair steadily and easily regenerates, and
because cutting hair poses no known health threats, human hair sales
occur regularly without impunity. As for the rest of the market involv-
ing parts of the body, the term "sales" is replaced with "donation." But
the euphemism hardly represents a functional distinction. After all,
the structure of each trade remains the same: parts of the body are
exchanged for money, or "compensation." Blood and human repro-
ductive cells from both sexes are the most common "donations" for
which compensation is permitted. Donated blood is probably the
most prevalently exchanged commodity in America's market of body
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
120. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 710.54 (2008).
121. Jennifer Alsever, Another Way to Bring out that Inner Rapunzel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2006, at 6. Great Lengths, a hair distributor, boasts annual sales revenues of $80 million-
all from selling human hair extensions. Id. Though Great Lengths was first established in
London, "American sales at Great Lengths [increased] 64 percent [from 2005 to 2006],
hitting $20 million and reaching 3,000 salon customers [in 2006]." Id.
122. See Hair Classifieds, http://www.hairwork.com/bidhere.htm#1/15/08%201%20
have%20about%2020%22%20to%2Osell (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
Winter 2009]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
parts.123 Blood donors typically receive twenty to forty dollars per do-
nation.1 24 That money is considered compensation for donors' time
and the physical discomfort resulting from the donation process. 125
Like hair, blood regenerates, so a donor's health is generally unaf-
fected by blood donation. 126
Human reproductive cells are also widely donated in the United
States.1 2 7 Like blood, sperm are regenerative, 12 8 enabling men to
make donations to sperm banks and receive upwards of seventy-five
dollars for each sperm sample that the bank accepts.' 29 Women, on
the other hand, may receive thousands of dollars for their egg dona-
tions. 130 Unlike sperm, eggs are not regenerable; every female is born
with as many eggs as she will ever have.' 31 Scarcity of eggs is not an
issue, however, since an estimated 400,000 eggs survive puberty, 3 2
and only one egg is released per menstrual cycle. 133 Therefore, a
woman may donate many eggs in her lifetime without risking ovarian
depletion or infertility before she hits menopause. 134 The great price
123. See Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable
Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 45, 48
(1995).
124. See, e.g., Plasma Blood Donation Center in Sherman Oaks, CA, http://blood
banker.com/plasma/centers/category/los-angeles (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
125. Jennifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents of
the University of California, 75 VA. L. REv. 1363, 1393 (1989).
126. Banks, supra note 123, at 48 ("Human blood continues to replenish itself in the
blood donor, generally leaving the donor in no worse condition than before the extraction
of his or her blood.").
127. See VICTORIA C. WRIGHT ET AL., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ASSISTED REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGY SURVEILLANCE-UNITED STATES, 2000 (2003), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5209al.htm ("In 2000, a total of 25,228 live-
birth deliveries and 35,025 infants resulting from 99,629 ART procedures were reported to
CDC from 383 medical centers that performed ART in the United States and U.S.
territories.").
128. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Face Value: Challenges of Transplant Technology, 31 Am.J. L. &
MED. 7, 25 (2005).
129. Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, People Are Selling Their Eggs, Sperm, Hair and Plasma to Make
Money-and Help Others, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 2007, at 7.
130. See id.
131. Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's
Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 17 (2003).
132. Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the
Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 193, 240 (1997).
133. Sunni Yuen, Comment, An Information Privacy Approach to Regulating the Middlemen
in the Lucrative Gametes Market, 29 U. PA.J. INT'L L. 527, 537 (2007) ("[I)n contrast to the
vast quantities of sperm that can be released per ejaculation, the female body only natu-
rally matures and releases one egg per month.").
134. If a woman has over 400,000 eggs and only one egg is released each month, she
would have to menstruate for over 30,000 years to exhaust the number of eggs in her
ovaries. See Guzman, supra note 132, at 240.
(Vol. 43
disparity between eggs and sperm flows from the fact that egg harvest-
ing is such a time-consuming, potentially hazardous, and physically
invasive process. The donor must inject herself with artificial hor-
mones every day for over a week to promote a greater "harvest," and
the actual collection of eggs involves extraction through a long,
vaginally inserted needle. 135 Because of the significantly greater "time
and inconvenience" associated with egg donation, donors frequently
receive up to $5000 for each donation.13 6
Regardless of their common labels, what makes sperm and egg
"donations" more like sales is the fact that the compensation donors
receive depends in part on certain qualities believed to exist in the
particular reproductive cells they donate. 137 In theory-as is true for
financial remunerations for blood donations-money given to repro-
ductive cell donors is intended to compensate for their sacrifices of
discomfort, time, and inconvenience. 13 8 If this were true in practice,
all sperm donors would receive comparable payments, and all egg do-
nors would collect roughly equal sums. But this is not the case. Sperm
and egg donors who possess certain socially desirable traits, such as
beauty or intelligence, receive greater "compensation" even though
they sacrificed the same amount of time and inconvenience as their
less educated and less beautiful cohorts.' 3 9 Some rare egg donors have
received up to $50,000 for a single donation.' 40 Because the market
135. Kar L. Karsjens, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and Patriarchy, 5
DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 63-64 (2002).
136. Roni Caryn Rabin, As Demand for Donor Eggs Soars, High Prices Stir Ethical Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at F6.
137. See Annie M. Lowrey, Will You Be My Baby's Mama?, HARv. CRIMSON, Apr. 29, 2004,
http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=502192 ("Tiny Treasures LLC, a Somerville-
based donation agency, creates a pool of 'Extraordinary Donors.' According to their web-
site, a donor with either an SAT over 1250, an ACT over 28, a GPA over 3.5, or enrollment
at an Ivy League school, qualifies as an 'Extraordinary Donor' whose eggs are worth more
than three times that of a first-time, well, normal donor. A Perfect Match, a California
based donation agency, currently advertises in The Crimson and posted the infamous
$50,000 offer for a tall, athletic, brunette.").
138. Ethics Comm., Am. Soc'y for Reproductive Medicine, Financial Compensation of Oo-
cyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 305 (2007), available at http://www.asnn.morg
Media/Ethics/financial incentives.pdf
139. Egg donors who graduate from Ivy League schools receive higher compensation
for their eggs than those who did not attend prestigious educational institutions. See Mary
Engel, California's Risky Trend: An Over-40 Baby Boom, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at B8. In
addition, minimum bids for sperm from particularly "handsome, intelligent, and healthy
men" started at $15,000 at an online sperm auction. See Don Oldenburg, Sperm Banks On-
line: Going Too Far?, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1999, at C04.
140. Margaret R. Sobota, Note, The Price of Life: $50,000 for an Egg, Why Not $1,500for a
Kidney? An Argument to Establish a Market for Organ Procurement Similar to the Current Market for
Human Egg Procurement, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225, 1241 (2004).
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price for reproductive cells significantly increases when certain donor
traits are present, the exchanges of money for sperm and eggs more
closely approximate "sales" than "donations," though the terminology
suggests otherwise. In sum, the market for reproductive cells is as
open as it is for blood, and exchanges of money for these resources
take place frequently and legally across the United States.
The market for organs is a different story. The Uniform Anatomi-
cal Gift Act ("UAGA"), first introduced in 1968,141 legalizes the posthu-
mous donation of cadaveric organs by consent of the donor, most
commonly by will or by indication on the donor's driver's license, with
consent of the donor's family. 142 The UAGA pertains to the donation
of any organ, eye, or tissue of a human being.143 The UAGA reflects "a
commitment to the belief that organs should be given as a gift, either
to a specific individual or to society at large." 144 It has been adopted in
some form by all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 145
Living donors may also give nonvital, nonregenerative organs-
most commonly one of their two kidneys-but federal law expressly
bars donors from receiving benefits in return, closing the market for
two-way exchanges.1 46 In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ
Transplant Act ("NOTA"), which prohibits the exchange of human
organs for "valuable consideration."147 This Act effectively bans the
sale of human organs, 148 though it permits people to donate them
instead.149 For purposes of NOTA, Congress defined "human organ"
to encompass "the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung,
pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart
141. Banks, supra note 123, at 67.
142. Matt Massar, Comment, Restricting Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Creating Life
or Destroying Freedom?, 10 SCHOLAR 43, 55 (2007).
143. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Givr AcT, § 2(18) (2006), 8A U.L.A. § 2(18) (Supp. 2008)
("'Part' means an organ, an eye, or tissue of a human being. The term does not include
the whole body.").
144. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1519,
1622 (1990).
145. Charles C. Dunham IV, "Body Property": Challenging the Ethical Barriers in Organ
Transplantation to Protect Individual Autonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 43 (2008).
146. Id. at 41 ("Currently, federal and state statutes specifically forbid the sale of
human organs.").
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
148. Notably, however, "[a]s of July 31, 2002, no one in the United States had been
prosecuted for buying or selling a kidney." See Vanessa Chandis, Comment, Addressing a
Dire Situation: A Multi-Faceted Approach to the Kidney Shortage, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 205,
224 (2006).
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e. Persons found guilty of violating this provision are subject to
a fine of up to $50,000, and/or up to five years imprisonment upon conviction. Id.
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thereof and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, includ-
ing that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services by regulation."' 150
To summarize, in the overall schematic of the market involving
body parts, the government allows people to trade regenerable parts
like blood, hair, and sperm, for money. Although human eggs do not
regenerate, they are hardly scarce, and their removal does not hinder
a woman's physical well-being. Therefore, the law permits women to
exchange their eggs for economic benefits. Organs, however, are
scarce and vital to one's health. Consequently, the government has
firmly closed the market for their sale through NOTA, which strictly
prohibits any exchange of money for human organs, whether from
living or deceased donors.
C. Rentals of the Body
Unlike sales in the human body market, in which "donors" cede
both power and possession over their body parts to other parties, body
rentals involve only temporary leases of control over one's body. Two
common examples of body rentals that take place in the United States
are prostitution and surrogacy. The market for prostitution is largely
closed, while the market for surrogacy is mostly open, for reasons dis-
cussed after a brief overview of the laws governing each.
1. Prostitution
Prostitution, which can be characterized as a sale of sexual ser-
vices or a rental of a sexual partner, is mostly outlawed, as determined
by state law.15 1 In all but two states, prostitution is illegal. 15 2 In Ne-
vada, prostitution is legal only when practiced in licensed brothels,
and in counties with populations of 400,000 or fewer people. 153 In
Rhode Island, prostitution is permitted, but prostitutes may not loiter
or solicit customers outdoors.' 54 Although no federal statute directly
proscribes prostitution, federal law bans prostitution near certain ar-
eas such as military bases, and criminalizes interstate movement of
persons for the purpose of prostitution, even if the prostitute is trans-
ported to a state in which prostitution is legal. 155
150. Id. § 274e(c) (1).
151. Lauren M. Davis, Prostitution, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 835, 837 (2006).
152. Id. at 840.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 836-37.
155. Id. at 842; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1384 (2000).
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2. Surrogacy
Surrogacy is the other type of regulated body rental; it essentially
involves the rental of a woman's womb and her ability to carry a baby
to term. There are two types of surrogacy, traditional and gestational.
In traditional surrogacy arrangements, the surrogate mother's own
egg is inseminated with the intended father's sperm; the surrogate
then brings the resulting embryo to term, but gives up the baby to the
intended parents. 156 The surrogate in traditional surrogacy is there-
fore genetically related to the child she carries. In contrast, a surro-
gate mother in a gestational surrogacy arrangement shares no genes
with the baby she carries because the intended father's sperm artifi-
cially inseminates the intended mother's egg, and the resulting em-
bryo is subsequently implanted in the surrogate's uterus.157
States take different approaches to surrogacy and payment.
Where surrogacy agreements are allowed, couples that "commission"
the birth of a child may pay for the medical, psychological, and legal
expenses that the surrogate mother incurs as a result of the arrange-
ment.158 Some states also allow the commissioning parents to reim-
burse transportation costs, maternity clothes, and lost wages so the
surrogate mother is not left in a worse position because of the surro-
gacy agreement.1 59 Other states distinguish enforceable and legal sur-
rogacy agreements from those that are unenforceable or criminal
based on whether the surrogate mother receives "compensation." 60
In those statutory contexts, "compensation" refers to any money the
surrogate receives above and beyond reimbursement for medical and
other necessary expenses. 161 Commissioning parents usually give their
surrogates well over $10,000 in compensation.' 62
Federal laws and many states remain silent on the issues of crimi-
nality or enforceability of surrogacy contracts, and state laws that do
address surrogacy diverge widely in their approaches. 63 Illinois stands
156. Denise E. Lascarides, Note, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Con-
tracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1221, 1225-26 (1997).
157. Id. at 1226.
158. Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surro-
gate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHI-rIERJ. CHILD & FAm. ADvoc. 529, 538
(2007).
159. Id. at 538-39.
160. Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of
Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CAPDozo L. REv. 497, 504 (1996).
161. Id.
162. Liz Doup, The New Extended Family, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 6, 2003, at
1E.
163. Watson, supra note 158, at 532, 537.
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alone in extending explicit permission to give and receive compensa-
tion for surrogacy services.1 64 Alabama, Iowa, and West Virginia all
forbid the sale of children, but have passed additional laws to clarify
that surrogacy arrangements involving compensation do not fall
within the meaning of the baby-selling statutes.' 65 In four states166 and
the District of Columbia, surrogacy agreements of any kind-whether
paid or unpaid-are unenforceable. 167 Six states enforce surrogacy
agreements, but only where the agreements do not include compensa-
tion for the surrogate. 168 In five states, surrogacy agreements are legal
only if unpaid. 169 Other states, like Arkansas and Texas, expressly rec-
ognize the enforceability of surrogacy agreements, but do not indicate
by statute whether or not those agreements may include
compensation. 1 70
As the preceding set of various state laws illustrates, the primary
issues in surrogacy law center on two main questions: whether the sur-
rogate may financially profit from her services as a surrogate mother,
and whether the surrogate can be forced to follow through and give
up the baby to whom she gives birth because she entered into a formal
contract with the commissioning couple. Michigan actually criminal-
izes participation in gestational surrogacy agreements that include
payments to the surrogate.1 71 New York issues civil penalties for partic-
ipation in for-fee surrogacy agreements, and imposes criminal liability
only when a party has violated the law twice. 172 Yet most states that
164. Id. at 532-33.
165. Id. at 533.
166. The four states are Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, and North Dakota. See id.
167. See id.
168. The six states are Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, and
Washington. See id. at 534.
169. The five states are Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Virginia.
See id. at 534-35.
170. Id. at 536-37.
171. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 722.859 (2008) (assigning penalties of up to one year in
prison and/or a $10,000 fine for participants in a gestational surrogacy arrangement in-
volving compensation, and up to five years imprisonment and/or a $50,000 fine for third
party participants who induce, arrange, or assist in the formation of such a contract).
172. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 123(2) (b) (Consol. 2008) ("Any other person or entity
who or which induces, arranges or otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate parent-
ing contract for a fee, compensation or other remuneration or otherwise violates this sec-
tion shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars and forfeiture to
the state of any such fee, compensation or remuneration.... Any person or entity who or
which induces, arranges or otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate parenting con-
tract for a fee, compensation or other remuneration or otherwise violates this section, after
having been once subject to a civil penalty for violating this section, shall be guilty of a
felony.").
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address surrogacy merely refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts if certain
requirements are not met.173 And the vast majority of states simply
avoid the issue of surrogacy entirely, reflecting substantial acceptance
of the practice in the United States. Consequently, the market for sur-
rogacy contracts is remarkably open, especially when compared to
prostitution, which is criminalized in all but two states.
3. Why Surrogacy and Prostitution Laws Differ
An in-depth comparison of surrogacy and prostitution helps un-
cover the reasons why the laws that govern each diverge so drastically.
Although both are rentals, they differ in the level of financial compen-
sation, extent of health risks, and physical invasiveness associated with
each. The average rates for prostitution vary widely, but compensation
for surrogacy typically ranged from $15,000 to $18,000 in 2003.174 The
costs keep rising: in 2008, surrogates reportedly received an average of
$20,000 to $25,000 for their services. 175 Consequently, the cost of even
the least expensive surrogacy arrangement greatly exceeds the most
extravagant prostitution fee. The price disparity reflects significant dif-
ferences in time investment, attendant risks, and health ramifications.
The amount of time that prostitutes devote to each client in a given
transaction ranges from minutes to hours. Surrogates, on the other
hand, devote almost an entire year-if not more-as they prepare for
pregnancy and carry an implanted embryo to term.
Furthermore, while prostitution places sex workers at risk for sex-
ually transmitted diseases, the use of medical screening and prophy-
lactics can significantly decrease that health risk.176 In stark contrast,
surrogates subject themselves to all the physical risks inherent in preg-
nancy. 177 And, their lifestyles are severely restricted, since all pregnant
women must avoid smoking and drinking, and they must limit strenu-
ous activity throughout their pregnancies, to reduce the probability of
complications or the delivery of an unhealthy baby.'78
173. See Watson, supra note 158, at 532-38 (finding that the relevant statutes of most
states referenced limit enforceability of surrogacy contracts under given circumstances, but
do not criminalize the creation of surrogacy contracts).
174. See Doup, supra note 162, at 1E.
175. Lorraine Ali & Raina Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7,
2008, at 44.
176. Davis, supra note 151, at 841.
177. For example, a woman may experience fatigue, cramps, nausea, and headaches
during pregnancy. Syrnptoms of Pregnancy: What Happens Right Away, MAYoCUNIC.com, Feb.
21, 2009, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/symptoms-of-pregnancy/PROO102.
178. Steven M. Recht, Note, "M" is for Money: Baby M and the Surrogate Motherhood Con-
troversy, 37 Am. U. L. Ray. 1013, 1025 (1988).
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Since surrogates sacrifice so much more than prostitutes in terms
of time, health risks, and restraints on activity, and since the financial
inducement for surrogacy is so far above that of prostitution, it may
seem puzzling that prostitution is so widely proscribed across the na-
tion while surrogacy is rarely addressed, let alone regulated. But a
shift from this functional comparison of the rented bodies to analysis
from a moral perspective may shed some light. Lawmakers and an
American constituency with primarily Judeo-Christian roots strongly
influenced the development of a set of acceptable mores in this na-
tion's early years.179 The conservative values that molded the first laws
against prostitution viewed the practice as a social evil, conceivably in
part because the Bible does not condone sex outside of marriage.' s0
The same Biblical foundations that informed prostitution laws
also help explain the surprising lack of prohibition against surrogacy.
After all, traditional surrogacy actually occurs in the Bible, when
Sarai-the then-barren wife of Abram, a venerated patriarch in Bibli-
cal history-sent her servant Hagar to sleep with her husband.' 8 ' Sarai
told Abram, "Go in to my slave-girl; it may be that I shall obtain chil-
dren by her."'1 82 Although the resulting pregnancy and birth caused
great division between Sarai and Hagar, the Bible never proscribed
the surrogacy arrangement, nor did it explicitly criticize surrogacy.
Furthermore, the Bible speaks enthusiastically about children as a
blessing. Psalm 127 reads, "Behold, children are a heritage from the
Lord, the fruit of the womb a reward. Like arrows in the hand of a
warrior are the children of one's youth. Blessed is the man who fills
his quiver with them!"' 8 3 The Biblical values that informed early
American attitudes towards surrogacy and prostitution esteem chil-
dren as precious blessings from God. Therefore, when the advent of
modem reproductive technology enabled the use of surrogacy as a
way to bring those blessings into being, a cultural acceptance of surro-
gacy was already firmly established. Using this lens, it should not be
179. See Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 1, 13 (1998) ("[L]aw is
saturated with moral terms. And the morality from which those terms is drawn is Judeo-
Christian.").
180. See Ephesians 5:31 ("For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be
united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh."); see also 1 Corinthians 6:16-18 ("Do
you not know that he who unites himself with a prostitute is one with her in body? For it is
said, 'The two will become one flesh.'"); Hebrews 13:4 ("Marriage should be honored by all,
and the marriage bed kept pure, for God will judge the adulterer and all the sexually
immoral.").
181. See generally Genesis 16.
182. Id. 16:2.
183. Psalm 127:3-5.
Winter 2009) TRADING KIDNEYS FOR PRISON TIME
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
surprising that the same people who vigorously oppose prostitution-
which involves sex outside of marriage-simultaneously endorse sur-
rogacy, which in its traditional form also involves sex outside of mar-
riage. The crucial distinction lies in the difference in objective.
Prostitution's key aim is sexual pleasure, while surrogacy's goal is
bringing new life into the world.
While the current laws governing surrogacy and contracts may
have been rooted in a conservative morality inspired by Judeo-Chris-
tian teachings, such religious and moral values alone may have been
insufficient to perpetuate those laws into the twenty-first century with-
out bolstering support from rationales that modern society finds com-
pelling. After all, as the popularity of abortion demonstrates,
contemporary America no longer universally holds the view that
"blessed is the man who fills his quiver"184 with children. Yet prag-
matic justifications continue to sustain the laws borne of waning tradi-
tional values. This nation still has an interest in new life, as children
represent a strengthened future workforce that will fuel tomorrow's
economy and perpetuate hope for prosperity. The government's lack
of significant regulation or restriction of surrogacy enables people
who want-but cannot independently produce-biological children,
to have and raise them into productive, contributing members of
society.
Furthermore, the most-cited secular objections to prostitution do
not apply to surrogacy arrangements. Common concerns about the
sex trade include: violence committed against prostitutes; the prob-
lem of pimping; the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases; 185 and the
belief that prostitution multiplies other forms of crime when brothel
profiteers funnel excess revenue into drug-related activities, gambling,
and extortionary enterprises.18 6 Those issues do not plague the womb-
rental market, however. Surrogacy does not spread disease, nor does
our society tend to associate surrogacy with crime rings. And violence,
in particular, is far-removed from the world of surrogate mothers.
Commissioning parents have a paramount interest in promoting and
maintaining the surrogate's welfare; after all, her well-being is essen-
tial to the safe and healthy delivery of the baby they so strongly desire.
These modern, practical considerations help account for the current
state of laws governing prostitution and surrogacy.
184. Id.
185. Davis, supra note 151, at 840-41.
186. See Susan E. Thompson, Note, Prostitution-A Choice Ignored, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REp. 217, 230-31 (2000).
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IH. Rationales for the Rules of These Markets
The South Carolina bill proposal, which contemplates the ex-
change of a six-month reduction in prison time for a felon's kidney
donation, represents the intersection of the human body and criminal
justice markets. It is useful to first compare the boundaries and rules
that govern each market, and to understand some important distinc-
tions that help explain the vastly different approaches that result in
one market being closed or largely regulated, while the other remains
open.
A. The Boundaries of Each Market
1. The Boundary of the Criminal Justice Market Is Voluntariness
The main boundary of the criminal justice "market," in which
prosecutors and defendants haggle over exchanges of prison time and
guilty pleas, is voluntariness. Unless judges deem a particular plea in-
voluntary after applying both statutes and case law precedents, the
market of criminal justice remains open for trade. Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, which contains explicit directions
and requirements regarding guilty pleas, represents Congress's proce-
dural safeguard to ensure that all defendants who plead guilty actually
do so voluntarily. 187 The stringent criteria of Rule 11 suggest that it
was designed to protect unwary defendants against the evils of over-
bearing state power and coercion.188 By demanding ajudge's personal
assessment of the defendant's demeanor and understanding of a plea
agreement and its consequences on constitutional and practical levels,
Rule 11 aims to satisfy the public's collective conscience, which might
otherwise suspect that prosecutors can rope unwitting defendants into
pleading guilty when they actually do not wish to do so.
In practice, Rule 11 heavily defers to the discretion of trial judges,
who largely center their inquiries regarding defendants' voluntariness
around a determination of whether the prosecutor imposed an im-
proper threat in order to procure a plea. The stream of case law in
Part I shows that judges draw that boundary very liberally in the state's
favor, as courts have been reluctant to concede that even extreme
prosecutorial actions are "coercive." As the Pollard case makes remark-
ably plain, courts refuse to find prosecutors' actions "improper" as
187. See FED. R. Cpdm. P. ll(b)(2).
188. Among other things, Rule 11 requires judges to inform and determine that the defen-
dant understands a series of rights and consequences that accompany any accepted guilty
plea. See FED. R. CRuM. P. Il(b)(1)(A)-(N) (emphasis added).
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long as prosecutors do what they otherwise have a right to do in terms
of pressing charges or pursuing maximum sentences. Therefore, in
the absence of blatantly unethical conduct along the lines of bribery
or threats of physical harm, judges do not render guilty pleas void on
grounds of coercion.
2. The Boundary of the Human Body Market Is Scarcity and
Essentiality
The market of exchanges related to the human body is often
closed or restricted, and I submit that any exceptions the government
has carved out in the rental and sales markets have been based on one
of two grounds: life-generating potential or scarcity. Prostitution and
surrogacy are both paid body rentals in which the body, apart from its
use for partnership in sex or the incubation of another's child, is left
completely intact. Since nothing is permanently alienated from the
body, the boundary that criminalizes the former while leaving the lat-
ter relatively unregulated is based on the degree to which each pro-
motes generation of new life.
All other transactions in the human body market involve sales,
which implicate complete alienation of elements from one's body. In
these instances, the boundary is drawn based on the scarcity of the
product in question. Blood, hair, and sperm all regenerate; because
the human body can produce more of each, their sale does not medi-
cally hinder the producer or otherwise diminish the "donor's"
body.189 And though human eggs are limited in number, they are suf-
ficiently numerous that a woman can "donate" eggs without sacrificing
her own fertility. The relatively vast supply of each of these resources
helps explain why the law does not completely restrict their sale.
Notably, however, the very nomenclature used in each context
signals a public discomfort with the commodification of certain
human body parts. Even though exchanges of money for some body-
derived resources look like sales, Americans freely "sell" hair, but insist
on using the terms "blood donor," "sperm donor," and "egg do-
nor."190 The reason may be that-unlike hair-blood, sperm, and
189. See Banks, supra note 123, at 48; see also Bloodbanker.com, supra note 124.
190. See Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the
Medical Market in Genetic Materia 72 AM. Soc. REv. 319 (2007) (discussing the buying and
selling of sperm and eggs, and the rhetorical use of the terms "sperm donation" and "egg
donation"). But see P. V. Holland, Selling Blood vs. Donating Blood, 94 Vox SANGUINIS 171
(2008) (advocating a different classification between paid and unpaid blood givers, stating
"blood donor should be enough to indicate that the person was not paid, or did not accept
remuneration[ ]").
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eggs all relate very closely to the essence of life itself. Therefore, the
market is open, but with the understanding that "donors" are com-
pensated for their time, physical inconvenience, and other efforts re-
lated to the "donation," rather than for the commodity itself. Whether
or not the nomenclature is accurate or meaningful, it undoubtedly
signifies a clear distancing from other commercial sales. Perhaps this
is because humans can survive without hair, but they cannot live with-
out blood, nor can they procreate or pass down their genes without
sperm or eggs. The language thus indicates our culture's elevation of
certain body parts over others, especially when they play an immeasur-
ably significant role in human existence.
Given the scarcity of non-regenerable organs and their integral
importance to one's physical survival, exchanges of body parts such as
the kidney and liver enjoy special protection from the law. NOTA, the
federal ban on organ sales, demands that organ donors and recipients
strictly adhere to the language of "donation," and rigorously prohibits
any exchange of value for the donated organs. 191 Unlike eggs, sperm,
and blood, organs are not replaceable, nor are they sufficiently nu-
merous to render their absence unnoticeable. And, unlike other body
parts that are sold under the guise of "donation," organs are so neces-
sary to physical welfare that their failure spells death. These crucial
distinctions between organs and other body parts set them apart for
different legal safeguards and standards.
The risks that attend living donors who choose to give away scarce
and vital organs increase the perceived need for legislative protection.
While living organ donors may survive with one kidney and a partial
liver, they do not give organs without increasing their risk for serious
physical complications. Even the process of becoming a living donor
poses potentially significant health hazards. For example, living kid-
ney donors may suffer "'adverse reaction to anesthesia, unexpected
blood loss, infection,' and most critically, the possibility of loss of func-
tion in the donor's remaining kidney." 192 In addition, people who do-
nate parts of their liver run the risk of "bleeding, infection, bile
leakage, [and] possible death."' 9 3
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
192. Nicole Hebert, Note, Creating a Life to Save a Life: An Issue Inadequately Addressed by
the Current Legal Framework Under Which Minors Are Permitted to Donate Tissues and Organs, 17
S. CAL. IrrrTRDis. LJ. 337, 350 (2008).
193. Id. at 350-51 (citing Columbia University Department of Surgery, Living Donor
Transplantation Explained, http://hora.cpmc.columbia.edu/dept/liverMD/procedure.
html#risks (last visited Apr. 1, 2009)).
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Furthermore, while the long-term health consequences of living
kidney donation have not been studied extensively, the removal of vi-
tal organs intuitively increases one's physical vulnerability. Should
cancer or some other incurable disease attack the remaining organ,
the donor himself might need to join the national waiting list for or-
gans because he lacks the natural emergency reserve that he gave
away. 194 As for the general effects of living donations on donor health,
one study of individuals who sold their kidneys in India found that
thirteen percent of participants indicated no decline in health while
eighty-six percent reported some level of decline. 19 5 Half of the par-
ticipants in the study also reported "persistent pain at the nephrec-
tomy [kidney removal] site," while over one-third complained of long-
term back pain.1 96
The boundary of the law governing the human body market is
drawn at the exchange of any vital and scarce organ. Even though
every living donor's relinquishment of a vital organ represents a sec-
ond chance at life for one of many thousands of desperate patients on
the national waiting list, legislators have unwaveringly closed the mar-
ket for sale of kidneys and other organs.1 97 The criminalization of or-
gan sales thus represents the law's paternalistic unwillingness to
enable the exchange of a resource that-unlike blood, sperm, eggs,
and other human tissue-is naturally scarce, yet essential, to every
human being. In the absence of statutory restrictions like NOTA, an
open market for these resources could greatly expose otherwise-un-
willing donors to unacceptable pressures and financial inducements,
to the detriment of their health and well-being.
B. Two Key Distinctions Between the Criminal Justice and Human
Body Markets
The preceding examination of both markets in isolation identi-
fied the legal boundaries that govern each. What follows is a direct
comparison between the two markets, which reveals two structural ex-
planations for the status of each market as relatively open or closed.
194. See Robert Shmerling, Harvard Medical School, Study: Donating Kidney Not Harm-
ful http://health.msn.com/health-topics/urinary-health/articlepage.aspx?cp-documentid
=100233204 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (noting that the evidence that it is okay to donate a
kidney is limited and that in recent years, some kidney donors have ended up needing a
kidney transplant).
195. Chandis, supra note 148, at 222 (citing Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health
Consequences of Selling a Kidney in India, 288J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1589, 1591, (2002)).
196. Goyal et al., supra note 195, at 1591.
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
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The two structural explanations hinge on the degree to which the
public at large believes that it has the power to hold the government
accountable for its actions. Where the government is charged with
overseeing exchanges within a market, and where the state is a partici-
pant in the market, the voice of the people-expressed through
laws-permit an open market, because the public places faith in its
own ability to police the judges and prosecutors who act on their be-
half. In contrast, laws restrict the human body market, in which ex-
changes are removed from public oversight and occur purely between
private parties.
1. Private Versus Public Oversight Over the Bargaining Process
Criminal defendants who engage in plea bargaining do so in a
system in which both prosecutors and judges provide significant gov-
ernment oversight. To begin with, defendants bargain opposite a
prosecutor, a representative of state power who is-in some form or
fashion-accountable to the general public.' 9 8 The heads of all prose-
cutors' offices in America are either publicly elected or appointed by
elected officials. 199 In either case, head prosecutors answer to a con-
stituency of voters. 20 0 In the federal government, for example, Assis-
tant United States Attorneys in each federal district work under the
direction of one United States Attorney who is appointed by the Presi-
dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate. 20 1 Therefore,
although United States Attorneys do not run for public office, they are
accountable to the President, who is directly accountable to a body of
voters. In addition, state attorneys general, county attorneys, and dis-
trict attorneys who prosecute locally are usually elected public offi-
cials. 20 2 All other prosecutors who work under the direction of these
public servants follow the orders and policies of the elected officers.
20 3
198. Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to
Criminal Court in Criminal Justice, 35 AM. CiuM. L. RFv. 371, 397 (1998).
199. Id.
200. Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police Prosecution of
Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1305, 1306 (1998).
201. Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-
Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REv. 923, 930 (1996).
202. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REv.
865, 888 (1990).
203. See Robert F. Blomquist, Integrity in Public Service: Living up to the Public Trust?: Ten
Vital Virtues for American Public Lawyers, 39 IND. L. REv. 493, 518 (2006) ("Public lawyers
have to report to superiors within their agency, department, or branch regarding the im-
plementation of law and policy; these superiors will usually (at least at the higher levels) be
political appointees of the same political party as the chief executive (or an elected official
other than the chief executive such as a state attorney general or county prosecutor).").
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So there is, at least from a structural perspective, a natural mechanism
through which prosecutors must answer to the general public.
Judges, who preside at hearings in which defendants plead guilty,
are also publicly accountable. Defendants and prosecutors cannot, on
their own, effectuate plea agreements because Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires judicial supervision over any de-
fendant's tender of a guilty plea.204 The judge's acceptance of the plea
agreement depends on his assessment in open court that the Rule's
requirements have been satisfied with respect to factors such as the
defendant's voluntariness; the prosecutor's integrity in the bargaining
process; and a factual basis for the plea.20 5 State courts employ similar
procedures, requiring that a judge's evaluation precede the court's
final acceptance or rejection of the plea.20 6 The legal landscape of
plea bargaining shows, then, that when defendants bargain away their
constitutional rights, publicly-appointed officials-or people who are
otherwise directly answerable to a general constituency-oversee its
process.
While supervisory positions of judges and prosecutors are built
into the criminal justice system, the human body market has no such
corollaries. Rather, exchanges related to the body-whether in the
form of sale or rental-are often shielded from public or governmen-
tal scrutiny because they occur apart from formal structures to which a
publicly accountable supervisor might have access. For example, pros-
titutes and their clients engage in purely private transactions, wholly
separate from any sort of public surveillance.
Public accountability exists to a slightly greater extent in ex-
changes involving surrogacy, human organs, tissue, and blood. In
those sub-categories of the human body market, either the govern-
ment or an organization has at least some oversight. The federal gov-
ernment has not commissioned any agency to supervise donors or the
daily operations of sperm banks, 207 nor does it significantly regulate
204. See FED. R. CGlM. P. II(a)(2), 11(b).
205. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11.
206. See, e.g., MAss. R. CruM. PRO. 12(c) (5) ("The judge shall conduct a hearing to
determine the voluntariness of the plea or admission and the factual basis of the charge.");
see also MAss. R. CRIM. PRO. 12(c) (5) (B) ("At the conclusion of the hearing the judge shall
state the court's acceptance or rejection of the plea or admission.").
207. See Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor: Potential Progeny, Paternity, and
Product Liability Online, BYU L. REv. 857, 870 (2007) ("On the federal level, no regulatory
agency oversees individual donors or sperm banks in their day-to-day business practices,
nor has the government enacted a uniform body of federal regulatory legislation, despite
the pleas that such legislation is desperately needed.").
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the private companies that "broker" human eggs. 208 But the market of
sperm and egg donation is still subject to some form of accountability.
The American Association of Tissue Banks ("AATB"), a non-profit, sci-
entific, and educational organization, plays a quasi-public supervisory
role by accrediting and certifying clinics that engage in the procure-
ment and distribution of human tissue such as human sperm and
eggs. 209 It developed standards to address concerns about safety and
quality in the delivery of tissue transfer services, 210 and as of 2008, the
AATB reported a membership of over 1000 individual members
and over 100 accredited tissue banks.211 Blood banks are also subject
to supervision, as they must be certified and are subject to govern-
ment regulation and inspection. 212
This difference in the availability of public oversight and account-
ability helps explain the difference between the open or closed state
of either market. Markets are more likely open where the public-
either through democratically-elected government officials or
through a third-party, non-profit organization-has a means, at least
in theory, to supervise the exchanges. Because either the government
or an organization like the AATB oversees the transfer of blood or
tissue, the market of exchange for those body parts is more open than
the market for prostitution, which is secluded from any public
oversight.
This distinction also explains why bargains are permitted in the
open market of criminal justice. Members of the public possess a col-
lective self-assurance in their own power as voters to monitor the ac-
tions of judges and prosecutors. If constituents are unhappy with the
actions of judges and prosecutors, they can refuse to re-elect the un-
satisfactory officials, or otherwise apply political pressure to the in-
cumbents who appointed them.213 Voters therefore expectjudges and
208. See Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation,
BYU L. REv. 107, 128 (2001) ("There is no legislation in the United States that regulates
the practice of oocyte donation.").
209. See American Association of Tissue Banks, About Us, http://www.aatb.org/
content.asp?conten tid=453 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter AATB About Us].
210. Sixth Circuit Holds that Expert Testimony Is Not Needed to Establish a Standard of Care in
Surrogacy Cases, 106 l-Lsxv. L. REv. 951, 956 n.41 (1993); see also AATB About Us, supra note
209.
211. AATB About Us, supra note 209.
212. Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 F-ucv. J.L. & TECH.
109, 154 n.172 (1991).
213. See Abby L. Dennis, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the
Superseder Power, 57 DuKE L.J. 131, 138 (2007) ("The political nature of the district attor-
ney's office reinforces the prosecutor's role as zealous advocate. As elected officials, district
attorneys use high conviction rates as measures of success, currying public favor for their
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prosecutors to act as agents-the substitute eyes and ears for the pub-
lic-as they complete their tasks, which include overseeing the crimi-
nal justice market with the public's conscience. This deep-rooted faith
in the power of the democratic system lulls voters into entrusting
judges and prosecutors with supervision over the criminal justice sys-
tem and all the exchanges that occur within it.
But the degree to which the public has reason to rely so heavily
on its own power to monitor judges and prosecutors as overseers is
questionable. Members of the community can only hold their public
officials accountable when they are sufficiently informed about the de-
cisions that the officials make. Yet the public has little meaningful op-
portunity to learn about plea bargaining decisions because
prosecutors rarely publicly report the existence-let alone the de-
tails-of the plea agreements they tender to defendants day after
day. 214 Furthermore, the number of convictions procured by guilty plea
are available in public records, but those records do not indicate
whether those convictions resulted from plea bargaining, nor do they
reveal the details of any such underlying bargains.2 15 The United
States Bureau of Justice Statistics reports the annual percentage of
cases resolved by guilty plea, but notes that:
[The percentage of convictions procured by guilty plea] is not the
same [number] as the percentage of felony convictions that in-
volved a plea bargain between the prosecution and the defense.
Plea bargains, in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in ex-
change for dropped or reduced charges or in exchange for a re-
duced sentence, is a common practice in the criminal justice
system. The proportion of those who pleaded guilty as part of a plea bar-
gain is not known.2 1
6
As a result, the public does not possess the knowledge it needs to
"police" prosecutors and judges with regard to plea bargains. Yet the
criminal justice market remains open, since the public relies on a
power that is virtually unexercisable due to lack of information, and
functionally, is little more than a mirage.
current political office and, in some cases, future aspirations, such as advancement to the
bench or Congress.").
214. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyr-
anny, 86 IowA L. REV. 393, 443 (2001).
215. See DAVIDJ. LEVIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T oFJUsTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CON-
VIcrED FELONS, 1996, at 34 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
scscf96.pdf.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
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2. Public Versus Private Participants in Exchange
In addition to the absence or presence of overseers, the identities
of participants-as private parties or public officials-in various ex-
changes also explain why their respective markets experience more or
less regulation. In the open market of plea bargaining, one party to
the exchange is the government, which incurs intangible costs and
accrues benefits on behalf of the public. As the Supreme Court noted
in Boykin v. Alabama, whenever defendants engage in plea bargaining,
they give up certain federal constitutional rights. 2 17 But those rights
are amorphous and abstract. Unlike property or tangible objects, the
defendant does not actually "give" anything to anyone when he waives
the right to a trial by jury or the right to confront witnesses. Yet on a
practical level, by relinquishing certain constitutional rights, the de-
fendant effectively saves a host of resources, time, and effort-the
benefit of which devolves to the court, to the prosecutor, and to the
tax-paying public that financially supports the criminal justice
system. 218
At the same time, the government gives something seemingly ab-
stract to the defendant in a plea bargain. In charge bargaining, for
example, the government forgoes the right to prosecute the defen-
dant for charges that the state otherwise could have pressed.219 In
those cases, the government eliminates any risk of conviction or incar-
ceration that the defendant may have faced with respect to those
charges. Similarly, in sentence bargaining, the prosecutor gives up the
public's right to incarcerate an offender for the maximum term al-
lowed by statute. 220 It is unclear who bears what cost as a result of the
decreased incarceration time or the decision to drop charges. The
most that can be said is that society collectively bears the cost (if any)
of the defendant's relief from prosecution on certain charges or his
early release from prison, and that the government's role as a party in
the criminal justice market enables these exchanges of intangible
costs and benefits.
217. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
218. See Wippman, supra note 33, at 869-70.
219. Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CruM. L. REv. 87, 96
n.41 (2003).
220. See People v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Mich. 1982) (finding that "the pros-
ecuting attorney, after conference with the defendant, may present to the court a sentence
agreement stating that the parties agree that a specifically designated sentence is the ap-
propriate disposition of the case[ ]").
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Since the benefits and costs exchanged in the criminal justice
market are abstract, vague, and dispersed throughout the entire popu-
lation, there is little reason for the public to suspect that prosecutors,
who presumably act on behalf of the community, have any incentive
to coerce particular defendants through plea bargaining. Even
though they directly participate in the trade, prosecutors theoretically
do not have a personal stake in the outcome of each bargain. There-
fore, the criminal justice market may remain safely open, because the
risk of coercion or undue influence from prosecutors, who have no
direct or personal incentives to force pleas out of any given defend-
ants, is relatively low.
In contrast, the human body market involves direct and more tan-
gible exchanges between private parties. In all cases, private parties-
with the occasional clinic or tissue bank serving as intermediaries-
trade with each other, and individuals bear the resulting gains and
losses. And money changes hands in every transaction: from client to
prostitute; from commissioning parent to surrogate; from recipients
of "donated" eggs or sperm, to their "donors." Therefore, the identi-
ties of traders and the benefits and costs incurred on either side of the
exchange are clear, unlike the criminal justice market, in which costs
and benefits accrue on behalf of an amorphous "general public."
The foregoing explains why the human body market is more
closely regulated than the criminal justice market. The difference
stems from a general suspicion that private parties will be reluctant to
police themselves and curb the risks of coercion inherent in many
exchanges related to the human body. Money's role as the primary
currency of exchange in unsurveilled transactions triggers concerns
that an open market renders poor people vulnerable to exploitation
by the rich.221 Naturally, some exceptions are permitted, as evidenced
by sections of the human body market that remain open for trade.
After all, if the body parts being bought and sold are regenerable or
non-vital resources, there is less at stake in a forced sale. Furthermore,
the fact that the resources are not scarce signals a greater supply, as
well as increased opportunity and means for demand to be filled.
These factors reduce the risk that private parties will exert undue pres-
sure over one another to force sales. Therefore, the law permits a rela-
221. Margaret Bichler, Lesson Learned: Why Federal Stem Cell Policy Must Be Informed by
Minority Disadvantage in Organ Allocation, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 455, 460 (2007)
("[I]mpoverished populations abroad are exploited by wealthy organ donees who buy
their organs for minimal compensation.").
[Vol. 43
TRADING KIDNEYS FOR PRISON TIME
tively open market with respect to the particular exchanges to which
those factors apply.
IV. South Carolina Bill-Intersection of the Two Markets
SB 480 is unique because it intersects two legal traditions that
ordinarily have neither reason nor occasion to interact. It also reveals
that the rules governing the two markets arrive at contradictory re-
sults. The bill proposes an exchange within the open market of the
criminal justice system-but it simultaneously involves a kidney "dona-
tion" that seems to fall squarely within NOTA's ban on organ sales. 22 2
At this intersection of two well-established legal traditions, which tradi-
tion should have the right-of-way? In the final part of this Article, Sec-
tions A and B present cogent analyses made from each perspective;
Section C distinguishes SB 480 from the issue of chemical castration,
which to some extent resembles this intersection of the human body
and criminal justice; and Section D explains which market, in the end,
could have been forced to yield had this bill proposal advanced be-
yond the introductory stage.
A. The Criminal Justice Market Perspective
An examination of SB 480 through the lens of the criminal justice
system in a vacuum suggests that the bill proposal falls comfortably
within the strictures of voluntariness that bounded the plea bargain-
ing market. In the seminal cases outlining the doctrine of plea bar-
gaining, courts determined whether impermissible coercion, marked
by prosecutors' "improper threats," had occurred. 223 In the absence of
threats of physical harm, bribes, or other activities outside the accept-
able realm of prosecutorial power, courts consistently ruled prosecu-
tors' plea offers were non-coercive, and defendants' subsequent pleas
were valid. 224
222. S.B. 480, read in conjunction with its proposed companion bill, S.B. 481, contem-
plates an exchange of a kidney for an inmate's freedom from up to six months in prison.
See S.B. 480, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007); S.B. 481, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2007). The National Organ Transplantation Act ("NOTA"), 42 U.S.C. § 274e
(2000), bans the knowing acquisition, receipt, or other transfer of human organs for "valu-
able consideration." Id. § 274e(c) (2). Early release from prison seems to fall safely within
the ambit of "valuable consideration" even though it is not necessarily valuable in a pecuni-
ary sense. Id.
223. See supra Part I.B (discussing the appropriateness of threatening prosecution of a
defendant's family members when it is within the prosecutor's discretion to pursue prose-
cution of those third parties).
224. See Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1464 (10th Cir. 1995).
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The key determinant lay in the court's central belief that as long
as the prosecutor merely threatened to do what he originally had a
right to do, the prosecutor's "threat" was proper.225 Therefore, since
Jonathan Pollard's prosecutor had probable cause to charge his wife
Anne with a crime, the prosecutor could use the threat of that charge
as leverage in plea bargaining with Jonathan.226 Similarly, even
though defendant Paul Hayes was not initially charged under an en-
hanced sentencing statute, his prosecutor's threat to bring that addi-
tional charge in the face of Hayes' refusal to plead guilty was viewed
by the Supreme Court as a permissible application of pressure that
was well within the prosecutor's realm of acceptable conduct. 227
With that theoretical framework as a backdrop, SB 480 should
pass legal muster when examined from the perspective of the criminal
justice system. After all, the bill proposal contemplates an exchange
between the state and the prisoner, similar to the structural scheme of
plea bargaining, in which the government both oversees and partici-
pates in the process. In addition, under the terms of SB 480, the lever-
age of reduced prison time is within the state's original scope of
power. While it would be impermissible for South Carolina to
threaten an extension of the inmate's sentence unless the prisoner
"donated" his kidney, its offer to abbreviate the sentence length-as the
bill proposal suggests-is permissible because the state has a right to
incarcerate a convict for the full length of the term originally imposed
at sentencing. Thus, the bill proposal is analogous to standard plea
bargain offers to reduce charges or decrease prison sentence recom-
mendations in exchange for guilty pleas. Therefore, SB 480 is unob-
jectionable under the law governing the market of criminal justice as
it currently stands, since the proposal does not involve any coercion as
courts have understood it in the context of plea bargaining.
Furthermore, the key distinction of public oversight weighs in
favor of the South Carolina bill proposal. Under the terms of SB 480,
the government would oversee the entire process of exchange in
which kidneys were traded for prison time.228 Just as plea bargains
occur within the criminal justice framework-rather than in an un-
225. One of the more extreme examples of plea wiring is illustrated by United States v.
Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), which is discussed supra Part I.B.2.d.
226. See Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011.
227. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361 (1978), discussed supra Part I.B.2.c.
228. Under the terms of the proposed bill, the agency head of the Department of Cor-
rections, a government actor, would have discretion to "award up to one hundred eighty
days of good conduct credits to any inmate who performs a particularly meritorious or
humanitarian act." S.B. 480, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007).
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supervised space between two common citizens-the bill contem-
plates a trade made under the government's presumably watchful eye.
In propounding the bill proposal, Senator Anderson even reassured
the public that, "We would check that this was voluntary and [prison-
ers] had all the information" and "[i]t would not be forced upon
them."229 His promise was offered to invoke the public's trust that
courts and other officials would supervise and ensure the legitimacy of
the resulting trades.
In addition to government oversight, the buffer of government
participation in the transaction also suggests that SB 480 should survive
legal scrutiny. Under this scheme, an inmate donates his kidney, and
the government reduces his prison sentence by 180 days.2 30 That ar-
rangement is abstractly comparable to sentence bargaining, in which
the government and the defendant are parties to a trade; the ex-
change now at issue simply occurs after sentencing, rather than before.
With the government playing both supervisor and participant, citizens
may feel satisfied with a false sense of security that they can hold
judges and prosecutors accountable. This leads to the conclusion that
the kidney-for-time market proposed by SB 480 should be open.
B. The Human Body Market Perspective
The pushback to the foregoing arguments finds fuel in the fact
that SB 480 involves non-regenerable and scarce body parts, the ex-
change of which is wholly prohibited by federal law. NOTA expressly
proscribes the trading of any human organ-including a kidney-for
"valuable consideration."23 ' The bill proposal contemplates a six-
month reduction of prison time for the "donation" of a prisoner's kid-
ney.232 Certainly, those 180 days must be considered "valuable consid-
eration" for purposes of NOTA. Liberty, unlike monetary
compensation, is not quantifiable, but it is still undeniably valuable. It
is so highly prized, in fact, that the government has, through the
Fifth 233 and Fourteenth 234 Amendments, prohibited itself from taking
away the liberty of its citizens without due process. These constitu-
229. Jarvie, supra note 9, at A25.
230. See S.C. S.B. 480; see also Stone, supra note 7.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
232. See S.C. S.B. 480.
233. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
234. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tional provisions represent societal recognition that liberty is a right of
paramount value to all citizens.
Furthermore, on a personal level, liberty can be reasonably con-
sidered "valuable consideration" to any inmate who would be willing
to donate a kidney under the legislative proposal. After all, if the extra
six months of freedom meant nothing to the inmate, the South Caro-
lina bill would present no extra inducement, and inmates would pre-
sumably donate their kidneys even without the promise of any such
incentive. But such an idea is ludicrous. In fact, the dearth of such
altruism created the perceived need for this bill in the first instance.
In sum, when SB 480 is examined simply under the lens of laws gov-
erning the human body market, it is clear that NOTA renders the bill
proposal moot, since the proposed exchange of kidneys for the "valua-
ble consideration" of a mitigated prison sentence violates federal
law.23 5
Furthermore, although the analysis in Section A demonstrates
that government participation in the SB 480 scheme should add to its
credibility, a more critical examination of the bill reveals a troubling
complexity. Benefits gained from a defendant's plea bargain accrue to
the entire society through decreased expenditures of publicly-funded
time and resources. In stark contrast, benefits gained from a pris-
oner's participation in the SB 480 scheme would serve the needs of a
single person, the sole beneficiary of the "donated" kidney. Therefore,
SB 480 actually represents a hybrid scheme in which the government
participates in an exchange of costs and benefits only on a facial level.
Because the government merely passes the benefit (in the form of a
kidney) on to a private party, the trade functionally occurs between two
private individuals-and the inmate sacrifices his kidney for the sake
of another citizen. Rather than representing the general public and
passing on benefits to broader society, the government's role under
the bill proposal is reduced to that of a broker who confers a benefit
to the inmate in order to facilitate a transaction between two private
parties. The twisted structure of this hybrid scheme thus departs from
the strict government/defendant relationship inherent in plea bar-
gaining. Under this analysis of the bill proposal, based strictly on the
235. Notably, the news media proffered this very analysis when S.B. 480 was first an-
nounced. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 7 ("Chances are the bill will not pass because it's
probably going to be considered a violation of federal law. Congress passed the National
Organ Transplant Act in 1984 that makes it a federal crime to knowingly acquire, receive,
or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human trans-
plantation. It is likely 180 days off a sentence could constitute 'valuable consideration.'"
(internal citations omitted)).
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rules governing the human body market, it seems obvious that the
market contemplated by SB 480 should be firmly closed.
C. A Look at a Close Cousin: Chemical Castration
Although no other statutes directly pit the criminal justice market
against the human body market in the way SB 480 does, laws in the
several states that authorize chemical castration of sex offenders pro-
vide useful, current examples of how the worlds of criminal justice
and physical invasion collide in contemporary America. In 1996, Cali-
fornia enacted the first chemical castration law in the United States. 236
The law required certain sex offenders to receive injections of a syn-
thetic female hormone that significantly-or sometimes completely-
deprives them of sexual desire and ability to function sexually.237 Six
other states (Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Oregon, and Wiscon-
sin) 238 have also enacted chemical castration laws. The laws governing
chemical castration in these states are not uniform, but most condi-
tion the mandate for chemical castration based on three factors: the
specific type of offense committed, the victim's age, and evidence of
recidivism. 239
For example, Florida imposes chemical castration in cases involv-
ing sexual battery, while Iowa issues orders for castration in a broader
range of cases, including indecent contact and sexual exploitation of
children.240 In all states, however, castration is limited to cases involv-
ing sexual offenses. 241 Furthermore, most states determine that a con-
vict is eligible for chemical castration only if the victim was under a
certain age, and the ceilings for these age limits range from twelve to
fifteen years. 242 Recidivism is a crucial factor as well; the majority of
states with chemical castration statutes do not impose any treatment
upon a first conviction for a sex offense. 243 Only when the defendant
236. John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth
Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 561 (2006).
237. Id. at 577.
238. Id. at 562.
239. Id. at 579.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Id. at 579-81. For the convict to be eligible for chemical castration in Iowa,
Louisiana, and California, the victim must be twelve years or younger; in Wisconsin, the
victim must be thirteen years old or younger; and in Montana, the victim must be fifteen
years or younger. See id. at 581.
243. See id. at 578-79.
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is convicted again do the state statutes authorize chemical castration
as part of their punishment.244
In states that allow it, chemical castration has been used to nego-
tiate the length of prison sentences; in that sense, it assumes a "mar-
ket" dimension similar to that present in both plea bargaining and SB
480.245 In 2005, a recidivist sex offender in Louisiana was convicted by
plea of aggravated rape of two girls, aged eleven and thirteen, and the
judge sentenced him to twenty-five years rather than forty years when
he volunteered to be surgically castrated. 246 In Wisconsin, chemical
castration may be imposed as a condition of parole or probation, so
an inmate may be freed from prison earlier if he consents to the
chemical castration.247 These examples demonstrate how the laws au-
thorizing chemical and surgical castration intersect the markets of
criminal justice and the market relating to one's body.
Although the castration laws bear some resemblance to the South
Carolina bill proposal because both pair physical invasiveness with re-
duced incarceration time, a critical comparison shows that they are
fundamentally dissimilar. Therefore, although state castration laws
have endured both scrutiny and protest in the last ten years, their sur-
vival should not be used as predictive indicators of SB 480's fate.
To begin with, unlike castration laws, the kidney-for-time scheme
does not directly relate an action on the body with an objective of
incarceration. Castration statutes demand satisfaction of several fac-
tors before castration can be imposed;248 these requirements demon-
strate that the purpose of castration is to prevent the commission of
future crimes. The laws authorize castration only for enumerated sex-
related offenses, since invasive physical treatment directly addresses
the sexual drive and ability that otherwise enable convicts to commit
those particular crimes.2 49 Furthermore, a key purpose of imprison-
ment of sex offenders is to protect society.250 When an individual is
chemically or surgically castrated, he nearly or completely loses his sex
drive, so the need for imprisonment on that basis is negated. Moreo-
244. Id. at 578-81.
245. Lystra Batchoo, Note, Voluntary Surgical Castration of Sex Offenders: Waiving the
Eighth Amendment Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 689, 698
(2007).
246. Id. at 690.
247. Wis. STAT. § 304.06 (2007).
248. See Stinneford, supra note 236, at 577-79.
249. Chemical castration "eliminate[s] the sex drive by drastically reducing the of-
fender's desire and capacity to engage in any form of sexual activity." Id. at 577.
250. Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power Or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Commit-
ment and Sicherungverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URaB. L.J. 1621, 1629 (2003).
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ver, statutory requirements regarding the ages of victims, as well as the
explicit reservation of castration for individuals who re-offend, also
highlight the fact that the bodily intrusion of castration is logically
related to its use in the criminal justice system.
Such a relationship is nowhere to be found in SB 480, however.
That bill proposal envisions a system in which the government bar-
gains with convicts to harvest their kidneys without any regard to the
crimes that they committed, specific characteristics of their victims,
their risks of recidivism, or any other discrete factor. The kidney "do-
nations" thus fail to serve any objective of criminaljustice or incarcera-
tion. Instead, this bill proposal is designed to harness governmental
authority over the incarceration system and to leverage that power to
procure more kidneys from prisoners within its control and jurisdic-
tion, in order to meet a desperate need outside prison walls. Attempts
to justify SB 480 based on the acceptance of chemical castration stat-
utes are logically futile because of this fundamental difference.
D. The Rule of Law
Intuitively, the preceding analyses should settle the question of
the bill proposal's viability. Despite the apparent legitimacy of SB 480
when viewed in isolation in the field of criminal justice, its suggested
exchange of human kidneys for liberty from prison is plainly pro-
scribed by federal law. Even though the exchanges would occur under
the supervision of the courts, and despite direct government participa-
tion in the trade, NOTA prohibits such trades. The fundamental
American concept of "rule of law" dictates that the government may
only do that which is specifically authorized by law.25 1 So, if private
citizens may not exchange body organs for valuable consideration,
certainly the government must similarly be restricted.
A brief detour to examine common law blackmail doctrine, how-
ever, reveals a surprising retort. Common law blackmail involves a con-
ditional threat to do something that, in the absence of such a threat,
might otherwise be lawful.252 Put another way, the two parts of a black-
mail threat are independently legal, but illegal when combined in a cer-
tain structure. 253
251. Kathleen R. Sandy, The Discrimination Inherent in America's Drug War: Hidden Racism
Revealed by Examining the Hysteria Over Crack, 54 ALA. L. REv. 665, 669 n.41 (2003).
252. Russell L. Christopher, Exchange: Meta-Blackmail, 94 GEO. L.J. 739, 743-45 (2006).
253. Id.
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A popular example presupposes X's possession of photos re-
vealing the scandal of Y's adultery.254 X may approach Y and demand
$500; while X is unlikely to find success with such a demand, his ac-
tion is nonetheless legal. X may also confront Y and threaten to dis-
close the photos; such a confrontation would likewise be legal. If,
however, X approaches Y and makes one threat conditional on the
other ("If you do not give me $500, then I will disclose your adulter-
ous relationship"), he commits the crime of blackmail. Scholars have
puzzled over the fact that, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated,
"What you may do . . .you may threaten to do," 255 but "the law of
blackmail declares that what you may do you must not conditionally
threaten to do."256
It can be difficult, however, to differentiate blackmail from gen-
eral "hard bargains," which are lawful. 257 How does one determine,
then, the dividing line? According to Professors Northrup and Steen,
"The key to distinguishing blackmail from lawful hard bargaining lies
in noting blackmail's distinctive triangular structure," which involves
third-party interests. 258 To illustrate, in the example cited above, the
exposure of Y's adulterous relationship would adversely affect parties
besides Y, such as his spouse and children. In other instances, the af-
fected third-party interests may extend beyond individuals to include
a group, the state, or the general public.259
Since blackmail is unlawful, one would expect that the "rule of
law" likewise prohibits the government from engaging in it-yet a sec-
ond look at plea bargaining reveals that, astonishingly, the opposite is
actually true. Some plea bargains that prosecutors tender to defend-
ants essentially contain threats with the same "triangular structure" in-
herent in classic blackmail. 260 The "wired" plea offer in United States v.
Pollard illustrates the triangular structure perfectly. 26'
254. Id. at 744.
255. Id. at 743 (quoting Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896)).
256. Id.
257. Sandy, supra 251, at 743-44 ("For example, in the canonical blackmail scenario,
Blackmailer shows Victim pictures of Victim engaging in adultery and utters to Victim the
following proposal: 'If you do not give me $1000, then I will disclose your adulterous rela-
tionship.' No individual component of the proposal is unlawful.").
258. Herbert R. Northrup & Charles H. Steen, Union "Corporate Campaigns" as Black-
mail: The RICO Battle at Bayou Steel 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 771, 807 (1999).
259. See id.
260. See supra Part I.B.2.d (discussing the structure of plea bargaining when a prosecu-
tor uses the threat of incarceration of third parties as a means to induce a defendant to
plea bargain).
261. 959 F.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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In Pollard, the prosecutors' "offer" to Jonathan Pollard included a
demand-not for payment, but for Jonathan's full cooperation with
authorities in the form of a plea, aid in investigation, submission to a
polygraph test, and other conditions.262 Prosecutors joined that de-
mand with a threat of refusal to plea bargain with Jonathan's wife,
Anne.263 In that case, prosecutors had a right to demand a plea bar-
gain-even though they did not have a right to force Jonathan to ac-
cept it. Thus, the prosecutors' demand was akin to X's demand for
$500 from Y. Jonathan's prosecutors also had a right to withhold the
opportunity for plea bargaining with Anne Pollard, since they had
probable cause and grounds to press criminal charges against her.264
Similarly, X had a right to threaten to reveal photographic evidence of
Ys adultery.
Significantly, the triangular structure is also present; Jonathan's
acceptance or rejection of the prosecutors' plea bargain had great po-
tential to impact his wife. The impact was magnified all the more by
the fact that she suffered a serious illness during the three months she
spent in jail, following her arrest. 265 It was under these plea wiring
conditions that prosecutors gave Jonathan Pollard the "option" of
pleading guilty. This analysis, which applies parts of the Pollard case to
their corresponding components of common law blackmail doctrine,
demonstrates that Jonathan's prosecutors were basically blackmailing
him. Any significant difference between plea wiring and blackmail in
Pollard's case lies in terminology alone.
This parallel between plea bargaining and blackmail makes
shockingly evident a pronounced double standard that the United
States legal system applies to private and government actors. Even
though plea wiring-a form of plea bargaining-fits perfectly into the
theoretical framework of common law blackmail, our legal system
nonetheless legitimizes it, ostensibly because it occurs in the public
sphere, through public servants serving public functions. The same
262. Id. at 1016.
263. Id. at 1015 ("Anne Henderson Pollard had also been arrested in connection with
Pollard's espionage, but the government refused to enter into a plea agreement with her
unless he pleaded guilty as well.").
264. Id. at 1021.
265. The court noted:
Mrs. Pollard had, for several years, suffered from a debilitating gastrointestinal
disorder that had not been accurately diagnosed prior to her arrest. During her
stay in the D.C. jail, she was seriously ill, losing forty pounds over a period of three
months. In February of 1986, Mrs. Pollard was released on bail.
Id. at 1016.
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lenity does not apply, however, to common citizens who impose condi-
tional threats on others in the private sphere.
NOTA's ban on the exchange of organs for "valuable considera-
tion" ought to absolutely bar SB 480 from passage. But the double
standard manifested so clearly through plea wiring blatantly ignores
the "rule of law" concept, which demands that the government obey
its own rules. The same hypocritical distinction could very well justify
the government's exchange of kidneys for prison time pursuant to the
South Carolina bill proposal, despite the federal ban on organ sales.
Undoubtedly, South Carolina legislators created this bill proposal
in response to a grave necessity for human kidneys. In order to survive
the scrutiny and restrictions of NOTA, however, the bill's sponsors
needed to subsume SB 480 under a well-established legal tradition.
They found their perfect solution in plea bargaining, which has gar-
nered sufficient support to survive over a century, and is now consid-
ered an indispensable fixture in the American judicial system.
Desperate to increase the supply of human organs for their constitu-
ents, the bill's legislative proponents conveniently framed their propo-
sal as another form of government/defendant interaction akin to plea
bargaining. By collapsing and diverting the bill proposal-the essence
of which violates organ-selling laws-into the theoretical framework of
the criminal justice system, the bill's legislative sponsors effectively
shrouded triggers for concerns about coercion, lack of public ac-
countability, and scant official oversight, from immediate view.
Therein lay the genius of SB 480.
Conclusion
Necessity is the mother of invention, and the need for more effi-
cient case disposal led to the advent and now-entrenched tradition of
plea bargaining. Authors of the South Carolina bill also attempted to
serve a great need in society by inventing a scheme whereby the gov-
ernment could leverage its power to harvest organs from prisoners, a
convenient and numerous pool of individuals within its authority and
control.266 In the end, the South Carolina bill was shelved and did not
move forward, as predicted.267 The bill quickly caught media atten-
266. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in US. Dwarfs Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008,
at Al ("[The United States] has 751 people in prison or jail for every 100,000 in popula-
tion. (If you count only adults, one in 100 Americans is locked up.)").
267. The bill was last referred to the Committee on Corrections and Penology on Feb-
ruary 22, 2007; since then, no further action has been taken. See S.B. 480, 117th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007).
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tion in its early introductory stages, and many people assumed that if
it became law, it would be overturned as violative of federal law.
268
Yet the power of the criminal justice system is stalwart. Citizens
may want to believe that when the market of criminal justice meets the
market of body parts, the law will protect the dignity of all people as
human beings. They may hope that there are enforceable boundaries
set firmly in place to prevent bad inventions from materializing into
oppressive nightmares. This Article's analysis of the South Carolina
bill issues a warning as it demonstrates that the government can some-
times operate "above the law." SB 480 could feasibly survive NOTA's
ban on organ sales simply because the bill contemplates government
participation and supervision, just as plea wiring persists despite laws
against blackmail. The bill demonstrates that legislators possess poten-
tially great power to co-opt one value-the protection of scarce and
vital human organs from coercive influence-and subsume it under
the guise of another well-established tradition, all in the name of crim-
inal justice.
268. Editorial, What's a Kidney Worth?, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2007, at C6.
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